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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(j)
(1953) as amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from final orders of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, entered by the Honorable Tyrone Medley, on March 12, 1998, and on
January 29, 1999, reentered on February 2, 1999. The January 29, 1999 order is the final
appealable order in this matter. There were no other motions.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Intervenors to intervene

post-judgment?
Standard of Review. Abuse of discretion is the proper standard for this issue. Jennerv.
Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983).
II.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to

Amend and refusing to enforce the settlement agreement?
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985) (citing Larson v. Collins, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah
1984)).
III.

Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Intervenors had standing to raise

all relevant arguments?
1

Standard of Review. This is an issue of standing and consequently should be reviewed
for correctness. Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. Department of Employment Sec, 878 P.2d
1191, 1194 (Utah App. 1994).
IV.

Whether the Lis Pendens was effective to impart constructive notice to

Intervenors where Plaintiffs Complaint was silent regarding the Utah County property?
Standard of Review. The standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. Johnson
v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced herein as Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 1, 1995 the Third District Court (hereinafter trial court) entered a final
judgment and ordered dismissal of plaintiffs First Western Corp. and National Fund, Inc.'s
(hereinafter Plaintiff) action to recover stolen coins. R.1654, 1656. The trial court dismissed the
case and rendered judgment based upon a stipulation entered into by Plaintiffs and Defendants.
Id. On October 21, 1996, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend/and or Correct Judgment
(hereinafter Motion or Motion to Amend). R. 1661.
On May 27, 1997, John D. Wagner and Lincoln Service Corporation (hereinafter
Intervenors) learned of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend through a separate pleading which Plaintiff
filed in the Fourth District Court, Utah County. R.2026, 2029. It was at this time that
Intervenors first learned of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend (nearly eight months after Plaintiff filed
the Motion). Id. Intervenors then filed a Motion to Intervene in the Third District Court action.
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R. 1718, 1745, 1885. The Third District Court denied Intervenors' initial motion. Id.
Intervenors then filed a Motion to Reconsider the Motion to Intervene. R.2332, 2340. On March
12, 1998 the trial court granted Intervenors' Motion to Intervene and Intervenors then filed a
Motion in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. Id.
On January 29,1999 the trial court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an
order which denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. R.2524, 2540. Plaintiffs appeal the trial
court's March 12, 1998 order granting leave to intervene and the trial court's January 29, 1999
order. R.2562.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Intervenors to intervene.
Intervenors satisfied all necessary requirements as set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)
and as interpreted in Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982). Intervenors timely filed their
Motion to Intervene by showing substantial prejudice and strong justification. Intervenors
showed they had an interest in the litigation and that their interests were not adequately
represented by the existing parties. Finally, Intervenors would have been bound by the Third
District Court judgment. Intervenors, therefore, met all intervention requirements
Next, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend and enforce the settlement agreement. The alleged settlement agreement would have
conveyed an interest in land; however, the agreement violated the Statute of Frauds, would have
harmed a bona fide purchaser for value, and would have been impossible to enforce. The trial
court also properly denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. Plaintiffs Motion was not to correct a
"clerical" mistake or error, rather, it sought a substantive modification of a valid money
3

judgment. Further, Plaintiff did not timely file the motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Plaintiffs Motion would have affected the Trustees of the
Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust but the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over
them; nor did the trial court have in rem jurisdiction over the Utah County property which the
Amendment would have affected.
Next, the trial court correctly allowed Intervenors to raise all relevant defenses to protect
their property interests. Intervenors had standing because they showed: 1) a distinct and palpable
injury, 2) that they had the greatest interest in the outcome of the litigation, and 3) that the
critical issues affecting their interests would not have been raised. Intervenors had standing.
Finally, the trial court correctly ruled that the Lis Pendens was ineffective to put
Intervenors on notice of the pending litigation. Plaintiffs Complaint did not mention the Utah
County property. A lis pendens has no independent legal significance, it is a republication of the
pleadings, and Plaintiff did not "publish" in the pleadings an interest in the Utah County
property. As a result, Intervenors had no notice of the litigation. Because they had no notice of
the litigation, they are protected by the Utah recording statute which protects bona fide
purchasers for value.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE MOTION TO INTERVENE
The trial court properly allowed Wagner, Lincoln and Mountain West (hereinafter

referred to as "Intervenors") to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter Rule 24(a)). Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the intervention. Intervenors petitioned to intervene as a matter
4

of right pursuant to Rule 24 (a) which provides in relevant part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action:
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
All parties agree that the correct interpretation of this statute is found in Lima v. Chambers,
Supra. In Lima, the court concluded that there are four requirements a party must satisfy in order
to intervene as a matter of right: 1) the intervention application must be timely, 2) the applicant
must have an interest in the subject matter of the dispute, 3) the interest(s) of the applicant is(are)
or may be inadequately represented, and 4) the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action. Id. at 282.
In this case, Plaintiffs received a money judgment on December 1, 1995 in the amount of
$200,000 entered against the "Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Trust." R.1654. Nearly eleven
months after the trial court entered judgment and dismissed the case Plaintiffs filed a Motion to
Amend the judgment. It is this Motion to Amend which prompted Intervenors to intervene. The
remainder of section I will show that Intervenors satisfied all four intervention requirements and
that the trial court properly granted the motion to intervene.
A.

The Intervenors Timely Filed the Motion to Intervene
Intervenors timely filed their motion to intervene. Timeliness of an intervention motion

is a discretionary question left to the trial judge. See Jenner v. Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d
1072,1073-74 (Utah 1983). In Jenner the Utah Supreme Court explained that the court's
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discretion extends to an investigation of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id.
Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion by examining the facts and circumstances of this
particular case to determine that Intervenors timely moved for intervention. Although Jenner
states that courts are reluctant to grant post-judgment intervention motions, it also states that
post-judgment intervention is proper when an intervenor can show substantial prejudice and
either one of the following: 1) a strong showing of entitlement or justification or 2) such unusual
and compelling circumstances as will justify failure to seek intervention earlier. Intervenors
showed a substantial prejudice and a strong showing of justification.
1.

Substantial Prejudice
Intervenors showed substantial prejudice by demonstrating that the effect of denying the

Motion to Intervene would have left the Utah County property subject to divestment. This is
substantial prejudice and satisfies the first part of the Jenner test.
2.

Strong Showing of Entitlement of Justification
Intervenors also satisfied the second part of the Jenner test by showing a strong

entitlement or justification to intervene post-judgment. The justification for a post-judgment
intervention is based on the effect Plaintiffs Motion to Amend would have had on the
Intervenors' Utah County property. As mentioned above, the effect would have been total
divestment of the Utah County property.
In addition, Intervenors made a strong showing of entitlement or justification in the
following ways: 1) prior to the intervention, there were no parties present in the litigation to
protect the Intervenor's interests because the original Defendants had no interest in the Utah
County property (see section II.A.3 below); 2) nowhere in the Third Amended Complaint did the
6

Plaintiffs specifically describe the Utah County property and thus the Intervenors could not have
known that their particular tract was the subject of litigation; 3) because of reason #2 above, the
Lis Pendens was void and did not give constructive notice to the Intervenors (see section IV
below); 4) in effect, Plaintiffs sought a judgment against Intervenors when they were not parties
to the litigation; and finally 5) Plaintiff moved to amend eleven months after entry of final
judgment and dismissal of the case, far beyond the ten (10) days provided for under Rule 59 (e)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For the above mentioned reasons, Intervenors made a
strong showing of entitlement or justification for a post-judgment intervention as required by
Jenner.
In sum, the trial court has discretion to examine the facts and circumstances of each
particular case to determine whether the motion to intervene is timely. There is no evidence that
the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Intervenors moved timely to intervene.
On the contrary, the record clearly indicates a strong showing of justification and entitlement to
allow the post-judgment intervention.
B.

Intervenors Had an Interest in The Subject Matter in Dispute
The second requirement for a Rule 24(a) intervention is that the applicant must show an

interest in the subject matter in dispute. See Lima at 282. When Plaintiff moved to amend the
judgment, the Utah County property became a matter in dispute. Plaintiff cannot now claim that
Intervenors have no interest in the subject matter when they voluntarily put it in dispute. For this
reason, the second requirement under Lima is satisfied.
C.

Intervenors' Interest Were Inadequately Represented
The third Lima requirement is to determine whether the intervening party's interests are
7

adequately represented. If the interests are inadequately represented, the motion to intervene
should be granted.
At the time of Plaintiff s Motion to Amend, no party to the litigation had an interest in the
Utah County property. Defendants had no interest in the Utah County property because they sold
it. This conveyance stripped them of any motivation to represent Intervenors' interests.
Plaintiff apparently agrees. Plaintiff admitted that the proposed change from a money judgment
to a judgment affecting title " . . . in no way economically impacts the Defendants." R. 1693.
Furthermore, it cannot be argued that the Trustees of the "Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable
Trust" represented the interests of Intervenors. The trustees were not parties to the litigation. In
fact, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend seeks to add the trustees as parties to the lawsuit.
In sum, there were no parties representing the interests of Intervenors prior to the granting
of the post-judgment intervention. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
granting the motion to intervene. The third requirement of Lima is satisfied.
D.

Intervenors Would Have Been Bound by a Judgment
The final requirement for a Rule 24(a) intervention is that the intervening parties be

bound by the judgment. In this case it is clear that the Motion to Amend would have bound the
Intervenors. If the Motion would have been granted in the absence of Intervenors, they would
have lost their property. This clearly binds Intervenors as required for Rule 24(a) intervention.
In conclusion, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) a party has a right to
intervene if four requirements are satisfied. See Lima, Supra. In this case, Intervenors met all
four requirements. Further, the standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. See
Jenner, Supra. There is no indication that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
8

post-judgment intervention. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted
the post-judgment motion to intervene.

II.

THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND PROPERLY REFUSED TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT
The trial court properly refused to enforce the settlement agreement and amend the

judgment. Such changes to the judgment would have wrongfully divested Intervenors of title to
the Utah County property. The standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. Corbett,
Supra. A reiteration of some background information is helpful to understand this Motion.
This case commenced on March 19, 1991. R.l. In 1995, the original parties began
settlement negotiations and on May 18, 1995 Plaintiffs made a settlement offer. R.2172. Shortly
before the case was scheduled to go to trial, the parties reached a settlement. R.2173-73. The
settlement, entered into by the original Defendants and Plaintiff, called for amendments to the
judgment in order to facilitate collection by Plaintiff. R.2173. Following this stipulation, the
trial court entered judgment on December 1, 1995 and dismissed the case with prejudice.
R. 1654. On October 21, 1996 Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend. R. 1661. It is this Motion to
Amend which will now be discussed.
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend seeks two remedies: First, to specifically enforce the
settlement agreement. Second, to change the judgment debtor from Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable
Family Trust to the trustees of said Trust. Part A of this section will address why the trial court
properly refused to enforce the settlement agreement. Part B will address why the trial court
properly determined that Plaintiff did not timely file the Motion to Amend. Part C will show that
the trial court properly refused to modify the Judgment to include the Trustees as judgment
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debtors because it did not have In Personam jurisdiction over them. Finally, Part D will show
that the trial court did not have in rem jurisdiction over the Utah County property and thus could
not amend the judgment to transfer title to Plaintiffs. As a whole this section will demonstrate
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant Plaintiffs Motion to
Amend. Any one of the arguments, standing alone, is sufficient to demonstrate that the trial
court correctly declined to grant Plaintiffs Motion.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Refused to Enforce the Settlement Agreement
Plaintiffs seek to enforce an alleged stipulated settlement agreement whereby Plaintiff

would have unilateral power to fundamentally alter the judgment from a money judgment to a
judgment giving Plaintiff title to real property located in Utah County. The agreement should
not be enforced because: 1) it violates the Statute of Frauds, 2) Intervenors are Bona Fide
Purchasers for value, 3) Even if the stipulation was valid at the time of judgment, Defendants no
longer had a property interest to transfer, and 4) Intervenors were not parties to the agreement.
1.

The Alleged Stipulated Settlement Agreement Violates the Statute of Frauds
The settlement agreement cannot be enforced because it violates the Statute of Frauds.

While it is true that Utah courts generally favor enforcement of settlement agreements, this is not
always the case. It is not true in this case because this case presents unusual circumstances. The
Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is a basic and long established principal of contract law that agreements are
enforceable, even though there is neither a written memorialization of that
agreement nor the signature of the parties, unless specifically required by the
Statute of Frauds.
Appellant's brief, p. 25 (citing Murray v. State, 111 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979)) (emphasis
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added). Thus, if the Statute of Frauds is implicated, the settlement agreement must be in writing.
Utah Code Ann. 25-5-1(1999) reads in relevant part: "[n]o estate or interest in real property...
shall be... surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party... surrendering or declaring the same." In other
words, if an "estate or interest in real property" is transferred, the conveying instrument must be
signed by the party surrendering the estate or interest. Id. In this case, the effect of the
agreement would be to transfer title to Plaintiff; however, there is no signed writing. The Statute
of Frauds prevents the relief sought by Plaintiff and therefore the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
2.

Enforcement of the Agreement Would Harm a Bona Fide Purchaser
In addition to violating the Statute of Frauds, this the trial court properly declined to

enforce this agreement because Intervenors are bona fide purchasers for value (BFP). As such
they properly received protection from the Motion to Amend. The Motion to Amend will
effectively strip Intervenors of their interest in the Utah County property despite the fact that they
took title in good faith, for value and without notice of any defect in title. The Utah Supreme
Court defined a BFP as one who acts in good faith, pays value and "... one who takes without
actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice of the complainant's
equity." Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). In the present action, Intervenors
have at all times acted in good faith, Mr Wagner paid $122,000 and had no actual or constructive
notice of potential title problems with the Utah County property. Furthermore, the Lis Pendens
filed shortly before Wagner purchased the property was ineffective to put him on notice of
pending litigation involving the subject property (see section IV). The trial court agreed, and on
11

February 17, 1998, ruled that the Lis Pendens did not give Intervenors notice of the pending
litigation:
[i]n this particular case the third amended complaint, face of the pleading, seeks a
money judgment. Therefore, the lis pendens is not effective to impart the type of
notice that require the intervenors to act.
R.2338. The result: Intervenors are protected against Plaintiffs claim to Utah County property.
See Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1197 (Utah 1993) (BFP's interest is not affected by
subsequent claimant's execution on the property).
In sum, granting of Plaintiff s motion to Amend and enforcement of the settlement
agreement would divest Intervenors of title and would destroy Intervenor's status as BFP. In
reaching this decision, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
3.

Even Assuming the Stipulation was Valid, Amending the Judgment Would be Futile
Because Defendants no Longer Have an Interest to Transfer
The third reason the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs Motion

is that an amendment would be impossible for Defendants to comply with. It would be because
Defendants no longer have any interest to transfer to Plaintiff. Prior to entry of judgment,
Defendants sold the property to Intervenors and no longer have any right or interest in the subject
property. If granted, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend would render Defendant's compliance with the
judgment impossible. Defendants cannot convey what they do not own. In fact, the Utah
Supreme Court has spoken to this issue in Corbettf. Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985).
Corbett involved various real estate transactions and various parties regarding property in Cedar
Valley, Utah. Id. at 385. The plaintiffs in the original action appealed judgments in favor of two
defendants (Defendants II). Id. Both appeals were dismissed with prejudice. The original
12

judgment called for a reconveyance rather than money damages. Id. Subsequent to the court's
dismissal, two of Defendants II brought before the court an order to show cause why the original
judgment should not be amended and corrected to enter an award of money damages rather than
reconveyance. Id. Defendants II argued that the real property could not be reconveyed because
the plaintiff had disposed of the property to third parties. Id. The trial court reversed its original
order of reconveyance because Plaintiffs could no longer reconvey. The Supreme Court
affirmed. Id. at 386. The Court stated:
The original judgment ordered reconveyance of the real properties at issue. Since
those properties had been disposed by the plaintiffs to third parties, making it
impossible for the plaintiffs to comply, an amendment of the original judgment...
allowing money damages, rather than reconveyance, was appropriate.
Id at 385.
Like Corbett this case presents a situation where conveyance is impossible. Defendants
no longer own the property and thus cannot convey it to Plaintiffs. Here, like Corbett, money
damages is the only remedy available to Plaintiff from Defendant.
4.

Interveners Were not "Parties" to the Settlement Agreement
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by not refusing to enforce the settlement

agreement. Plaintiff relies on Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607
(Utah 1979) for the proposition that "[settlements are favored and even encouraged because of
the obvious benefits to the parties, as well as the judicial system. Appellants Brief, p. 25
(emphasis added). Intervenors agree. However, Plaintiff fails to point out that Intervenors are
not "parties." Intervenors were not parties to the settlement agreement and thus reliance on
Tracy Collins Bank is without merit. Further, it is a stretch to argue that it is beneficial to the
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judicial system to divest a BFP of an interest in land by enforcing an unsigned settlement
agreement that the BFP had no part in making. Plaintiffs reliance on Tracy Collins Bank has no
merit.
To summarize section II.A, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
enforce the settlement agreeement. First, the agreement violated the Statute of Frauds. Second,
enforcement would have harmed a BFP. Third, the agreement would be impossible for
Defendants to comply with. Fourth, Intervenors were not parties to the agreement.
B.

Plaintiff did not Timely File Motion to Amend and Therefore the Trial Court
Lacked Jurisdiction to Hear Plaintiffs Motion
Plaintiff sought to Amend the trial court's judgment entered on December 1, 1995.

R.1654. Plaintiffs filed this Motion on October 21, 1996, nearly eleven months after the trial
court entered judgment. R.1661. The trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs Motion to
Amend was not proper under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a) (hereinafter Rule 60(a)) and
that the Motion was untimely under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) (hereinafter Rule
59(e)). Section B.l will discuss Rule 60(a). Section B.2 will discuss Rule 59(e).
1.

Rule 60(a) is not Applicable to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend
It is Plaintiffs contention that the Motion to Amend was proper under Rule 60(a) despite

the fact that eleven (11) months passed between the time of final judgment and the filing of the
motion. Rule 60(a) reads:
Clerical mistakes in judgment, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders.
Plaintiffs Motion did not seek to correct an "clerical" mistake or omission; Plaintiff sought to
14

m a k e a substantive m o d i f i c a t i o n and thus R u l e 6 0 ( a ) w a s not the proper b a s i s for P l a i n t i f f s
Motion.
a.
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The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what constitutes a "clerical" mistake
or error. In Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Ins., 669 P.2d 1201 (I Jtah 1983) the Court stated
that a clerical n listake i mdei R \ lie 60(a) is "il1"

a t> pe of i nistake or omission mechanical ii I

nature which is apparent on the record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment
by an attorney." Id at 1206 (c iting In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp, 266 F Supp 605, 607
(1967); See also Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970) ("[t]he distinction between a
judicial error and a clerical error does not depend on who made it. Rather, it depends on whether
it was made m rendering the ji ldgment oi in recording the ji idgment rendered") In Stangei • t h e
"mechanical" mistake involved a miscalculation of numbers. This mistake, the Supreme Court
noted, was apparent from the record and the Court remanded the case simply to correct the
calci ilation

I he case at hand does not present si ich a "clei ical "' mistake.

In this case, Plaintiffs sought a money judgment and the trial court granted that money
judgment. The trial court did not make a scrivener's error; it gave Plaintiff exactly what Plaintiff
wanted - a mone> judgment. Plaintiffs decision to pursue a money judgment as opposed to an
interest in real property is a substantive legal decision, a decision to which Rule 60(a) does not
apply. See Bi in i, , W 'hitmit c " 956 F 2d 509 (5th Cir 1992) (i tile governing clerical mistakes does
not apply to a motion seeking to correct an error of substantive judgment that affects the
substantive rights of a party).
Plaintiff 1: lad an opportunity to inch ide ai l interest ii t the I Jtah Con n it) propei !:> pi ic i to
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final judgment. In fact, several proposed judgment drafts were negotiated by the original parties
before deciding on the wording found in the final judgment. R. 1669-1700. Rule 60(a) is not a
proper basis for Plaintiff to now attempt to "back door" an interest in the property. Because Rule
60(a) is not a proper basis for Plaintiffs motion, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
motion under the rule. Plaintiffs Motion did not seek to correct a "clerical" mistake.
b.

Plaintiffs Motion Sought to Make a Substantive Modification of the Judgment
In reality, and as alluded to in section B.l .a, Plaintiffs Motion sought a substantive

modification to the final judgment. Plaintiff sought to convert a money judgment to a judgment
that would give Plaintiff an interest in real property. To this end, a motion under Rule 60(a) is
not proper. The Utah Court of Appeals addressed this question in State v. Moya 815 P.2d 1312,
(Utah App. 1991). In Moya, the Court, in dicta, stated: "[s]ubstantive modifications to address
subsequent developments are not authorized under Rule 60(a)." Id. at 1317. The defendant in
Moya sought to revise the wording of a sentence in the judgment. The court noted that Rule
60(a) was not the proper basis for such an amendment. Id. See also Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d
401, 402 (Utah 1984) (Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a substantial nature
particularly where the error is unilateral). Plaintiffs Motion sought to make a substantive
modification. This modification is not a proper subject matter for a Rule 60(a) motion.
In conclusion, Rule 60(a) only applies to "clerical" errors. Plaintiffs Motion did not seek
to modify such an error; in fact, Plaintiff sought to make a substantive modification of the
judgment giving Plaintiff a property interest in the Utah County property. Thus, the trial court
correctly ruled that Rule 60(a) was not a proper basis for Plaintiffs motion.
2.

Plaintiff did not Timely File Motion under Rule 59(e)
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Plaintiff did not timely file Motion to A m e n d within the ten (10) days prescribed by Rule
59(e). Rule 59(e) reads:
59(e). Motion to alter or amend judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgn lei it
shall be served not later than ten (10) days after entry of the judgment.
Plaintiff filed Motion to A m e n d nearly eleven (11) months after entry o f final judgment. R.1654,
16' ; 1 i Maintiff was clearly beyond the ten (10) days allowed under the Rule and therefore the
«• • .

uuii s Motion under Rule 59(e).

To summarize, the trial court correctly concluded that Rule 60(a) was not a proper basis
for Plaintiffs Motion because Plaintiff did not seek to modify a "clerical" mistake In additioi I,
Plaintiff missed the ten (10) day filing deadline prescribed by Rule 59(e). For the foregoing
reasons, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs motion to amend.
C.

rhe Trial Court did not Have In Personam Jurisdiction Over Trustees and
rherefore it Could not Amend Judgment to Include Trustees as Judgment Debtors
This section will continue to show that the trial court correctly refused to enforce the

settlement agreement and to amend the judgment.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Trustees and therefore could not alter the
judgment to affect them. Plaintiffs never served Scott W. Collard or Christine C. Lewis as
I rusteesof the Ii ilic C I h< >mas Irrev < >a ible I 'amily I i i ist

il

R 1006 1008 1009, 1011 lit . ti ic

the Third Amended Complaint named Scott W. Collard and Christine C. Lewis in their
individual capacity, not trustees. R.965. In addition, Plaintiff named as defendant "The Julie C.
Plaintiffs served Scott Collard as "agent" for the Trust. R. 1014 \.n agency is a relationship between two
persons. A trust is not a natural or artificial person; rather, a trust is a property interest incapable of holding title to
real property. See Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1983) (trust is not an entity capable of holding title
to real estate). Thus, it is not possible for a trust to have an agent. If the trust cannot have an agent, then Plaintiffs
service on Scott Collard as "agent" of the trust is ineffective as service upon Scott Collard as "Trustee."
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Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust." Id. Further, the record is silent regarding any pleadings,
appearances, or motions filed by trustees in their capacity as trustees. Plaintiffs fundamental
failure to name the trustees as defendants resulted in the trial court's inability exercise
jurisdiction over the Trustees. See Price v. Dean, 990 S.W.2d 453, 454-55 (Tex.App. 1999)
(trustee never served in her capacity as trustee and trust not named as defendant; therefore, the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over trustee).
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), personal service must be made:
. . . by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to the individual
personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place
of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by
delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.
Plaintiff must serve process on each defendant. Without service, a court has no jurisdiction over
individuals. 62B Am.Jur.2d Process § 4 (1990). Here, Plaintiffs failure to serve Trustees is
fatal because it meant the trial court never had jurisdiction over them. See Murdoch v. Blake, 484
P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971) ("[t]he proper issuance and service of summons is the means of
invoking the jurisdiction of the court and of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant..."); See
also Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) (the requirements of Rule 4 relating to service
of process are jurisdictional). The remedies sought by Plaintiff cannot be granted without in
personam jurisdiction over Trustees and therefore the trial court never had in personam
jurisdiction over Trustees.
Plaintiff sought first to specifically enforce a settlement which against Trustees. Plaintiff
also sought to collect a $200,000 judgment against Trustees. In order for the court to grant either
remedy, it must have had personal jurisdiction over Trustees. Because Plaintiff failed to name
18

Trustees as defendants and serve them with process, the trial court never had jurisdiction over
them. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs requests.
D,

I he Trial Court did not Have In rem Jurisdiction Over the Utah County Property
md Therefore it Could not Amend the Judgment to Transfer Title to Plaintiffs
The fourth reason why the trial court properly refused to grant Plaintiffs Motion is that

the trial court lacked in rem jurisdiction over the Utah County property. Plaintiff did not mention
in the pleadings the Utah County property and as a resi lit, the trial coi u t coi ilcl i lot ha\ e had «
rem jurisdiction over the property.
1.

Plaintiff Made no Allegations Regarding Utah County Property in Complaint
Plaintiff did not assert an interest in the Utah County property in the Third Amended

Complaint (Complaint). In Plaintiffs seventh claim for relief, Plaintiff asks t h a t " . . . a
consti i

:::()! porate assets to prevent r h o m a s ' improper i lse of

the assets," and that the c o u r t " . . .should determine the true ownership of said assets and deduce
that they are subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiffs." R.976. This reference to

to the gold coins stolen b y defendants. R.971. Further, in Plaintiffs prayer for relief, paragraph
l», Plaintiff seeks:
For Judgment on Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief against Defendant Kelly
Thomas for damages in the amount to be proven at trial, but in any case at least
$850,000 plus punitive damages in the sum of $1,000,000.00.
Again.
Plaintiff had a duty to plead and prove his cause of action. In order to do that, the
pleadings must set forth all claims and all remedies. In addition, the facts and legal theories must
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be stated with reasonable definiteness, certainty and clarity. 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleadings § 113
(1999). Plaintiff did not mention real property and because Plaintiff failed to do this, the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the real property.
2.

Judgment Must be Supported by Pleadings or it is Void
Because plaintiffs pleadings failed to assert an interest in the Utah County property, an

amendment giving Plaintiff an interest in the property cannot be supported. A judgment must be
supported by the pleadings. 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleadings § 3 (1999). The pleadings must contain a
proper basis for subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Id. In fact, a party may not be granted
relief in the absence of proper pleadings because a judgment based on an issue not pleaded is a
nullity. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 2 (1994). As mentioned in II.D.l, Plaintiff did not plead an
interest in any real property. Therefore, a judgment giving Plaintiff an interest in real property is
a "nullity."
Furthermore, Plaintiff is not entitled an interest in the real property under Rule 8(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule reads:
(1) a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief which he deems himself entitled.
Plaintiff failed to satisfy this rule. Section (a)(1) requires Plaintiff to include a plain statement of
all claims to which he is entitled. Plaintiff never asserted that he is entitled to relief by way of
title to real property. Section (a)(2) is a correlative to (a)(1) in that it requires the claims in (a)(1)
to have a corresponding demand for judgment. Again, Plaintiff sought only money damages.
Plaintiffs pleading is not sufficient to support the relief he now seeks.
In sum, the Complaint is silent regarding real property. As a result of this silence,
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Plaintiffs request for an Amendment cannot be supported because it was insufficient to grant the
trial court jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Plaintiff "s Moti< n i

III.

FHE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HEARD INTERVENORS' DEFENSES
BECAUSE INTERVENORS HAD STANDING TO MAKE THE DEFENSES
I he third issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court proper n .*M

Intervenors' defenses.
Intervenors had standing to assail the Plaintiffs motion. The Utah Supreme Court, in
Terrai •< * v. I Hah Be /. OfStah • L v ids & Forestry, 716 I > 2d 796, 799 (I Itah 1/986) gi\ es us tl: le test
for standing:
The first general criterion is that the 'plaintiff must be able to show that he has
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the
outcome of the legal dispute'... Second, it a plaintiff does not have standing
under the first criterion, he may have standing if no one else has a greater interest
in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue.
1 1 ins Ii iter v ei lors i ni ist si low eitl ler 1) a distinct inji u ;; ' 1:1 lat gi\ 'es them a personal stake in tl le
outcome of the dispute, or 2) no one else has a greater interest in the outcome and the issues are
unlikely to be raised by the existing parties. Intervenors satisfied both criteria. The remainder of
this section w ill show: A) tl: lat 1 < m i< :*< v applies to a 60(a) i i lotion, B) Inter v enoi s satisfied both
Terracor criteria, C) Intervenors had standing to assert all relevant defenses, and D) the case law
relied upo

Maintiff is not ~- • :.

. In its entirety,, this set i •* ;

:

Intervenors had standing. The standard of review for this issue is correctness. See Aldrich,
Nelson, Weight, &Esplinv. Department of Employment Sec, 878 P.2d 1191 (UtahApp. 1994).
A.
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The test in Terracor has been applied by Utah courts to determine whether a party had
standing to object to a motion under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). See Blodgett v. Zions
First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1988) (a party lacked standing to object to a Rule
60(a) motion); See also Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah App. 1990) (test applied to a
determine whether a defendant had standing to raise a statute of frauds defense even though he
had no interest in the subject real property). Thus, Terracor is the proper test to determine
standing to raise arguments at a 60(a) motion hearing.
B.

Intervenors Showed Distinct and Palpable Injury That Gave Them a Personal Stake
in the Outcome of the Litigation
Intervenors showed a distinct injury. The injury was a loss of property. As stated earlier,

Intervenors were the only parties, other than Plaintiffs, who had an interest in the Utah County
property. Defendants conveyed the Utah County property to Intervenors thus divesting their
interest in the property. By virtue of this conveyance, no existing parties to the litigation had a
personal stake in the Utah County property. Therefore, Intervenors showed distinct injury that
gave them a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. This satisfies the first part of
Terracor.
C.

Intervenors Had The Greatest Interest in The Outcome of The Motion to Amend
and The Issues May Not Have Been Raised by Other Parties to The Lawsuit
If Intervenors were not successful in proving part one of Terracor, in the alternative, they

could also prove that they had the greatest interest in the outcome of the litigation and that the
issues may not have been raised in their absence (the term "litigation" refers to the Motion to
Amend). This is the second alternative found in Terracor. As mentioned above, the Intervenors
would lose title to their property if the trial court granted the Motion. No other party to the
22

lawsuit had a greater interest than that. The Defendants had no interest in the Utah County
property because they conveyed the property to Intervenors. Therefore, no one, other than
Plan itiff, had ai :t ii itei est ii 1 the I Itah Coi inty proper ty
In sum, Intervenors had the greatest interest in the outcome of the litigation and no other
party to the litigation would have had a reason to protect Intervenors interests. Intervenors,
therefore', had standing to cl lallenge the ai nendn lent to the judgment
Intervenors Had Standing to Raise all Relevant Arguments to Protect Their
Interests
I ;inall> I laintiffs assei t that It iter venors had t 10 standing to assert certain defenses.
Appellants Brief, p. 22. However, In Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 135 P. 103 (Utah 1913)
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of which arguments a party may raise. The

interest in the real estate " . . . may assail a judgment, deed, or any other instrument affecting his
title for the reason that such judgment or instruments are void, upon the ground of fraud or for
any other legal reason."" ia. ai 105 (emphasis added) I hi is accordii lg to Doyt e a pai 1:> that
wishes to protect a property interest may raise "any legal reason." Therefore, the trial court
pi opei 1> heard Intervenors' arguments.
E.

Plaintiffs Case Law is Not Controlling For This Issue
Plaintiff relies upon Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. Department of Employment Sec.

878 P 2d 1191 (I Ital I 1994) a s si ippoi t, foi ti le proposition tl lat Intervenors 1 lad no standing to
raise certain arguments. However, this case is distinguishable from the present case. In Aldrich,
the petitioner was a law firm that appealed a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial
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Commission of Utah (Board) limiting attorneys fees to 25% of the recovery. The petitioner/law
firm argued that the Board's decision to limit attorney's fees denied his client due process. The
Court concluded that while the petitioner had a personal stake in receiving attorney's fees,
"[ajldrich (petitioner) does not have a personal stake in whether Mr. Karbakhsh's (client) due
process rights were violated." Aldrich at 1194 (parentheticals added). Thus, in Aldrich there
were other parties with a more personal stake in the outcome, namely the petitioner's client.
However, in this case, there was no other party that had a greater interest in the outcome than the
Intervenors. No one had more incentive than Intervenors to raise the issues. Aldrich is not
controlling.
Plaintiffs reliance on Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992) is also misguided.
Plaintiff claims that the Lis Pendens deprived Intervenors of standing. However, Shelledy is
factually distinguishable from the present action. In Shelledy, the Plaintiff, purchased property
from a federal agency. The property was subject to a tax deed because of delinquent taxes in
1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983. While the Plaintiff did not challenge the 1978 and 1980
assessments, he argued that because the federal government is exempt from taxation from a
sovereign state, the 1981-83 assessments were invalid. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that
the Plaintiff lacked standing to assert the sovereign immunity defense because he was on "record
notice" of defendant's sheriff deed at the time he took title. Id. At 790. In the present case,
Intervenors had no constructive notice of the defendant's rival claim to the property. In fact,
Intervenors had no actual notice until May 27, 1997 when they learned of Plaintiff s Motion to
Amend. Shelledy turned on notice and because Intervenors had no notice of a rival claim to the
property, Shelledy is not controlling on the issue of standing.
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Iii conclusion, Intervenors had standing. Intervenors satisfied the Terracor criteria by
demonstrating that this litigation would injure them distinctly and that they had the greatest
interest in tl le 01 ltcoi i le of tl le litigation Fi n thei i i lore Interv ei lors had a sen u id legal basis tc • raise
any relevant arguments in an effort to protect their interests.
IV.

THE LIS PENDENS WAS NOT EFFECTIVE TO PUT WAGNER ON
N O T I C E AND THIIS WAGNER W A S A BONA FIDE PURCHASER
The fourth and final issue raised by Appellant is whether the Lis Pendens put Intervenors

on constructive notice that the Utah County property was the subject of litigation.
Oi i October 23 1992 I ""laii itiffs filed a lis pendens (hereinafter

I -is Pendens' ) ii i the I Jtal I

County Recorder's office which described the Utah County property. Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, p.3. Shortly thereafter, Christine C. Lewis and Scott W. Collard,
tn istees of the Ji ilie C I homas Irre\ ocable Fai nil} I i i ist c :)i ive> eel the pi operl

)

Wagner. Id. The parties executed the deed on October 30, 1992 and Wagner recorded the deed
on November 4, 1992

in order to finance the purchase, Wagner secured a loan for $124,000;

file loan was secured by a deeu oi* trust recorded on November 4, 1992 Id at 4
concluded that "
Propen

;-

1 1 le trial • :• :>n u 1:

Intervenors did not have constructive notice of Plaintiff s claims to the Real
.• . - Pendens. Id at 10 In addition, the trial court concluded that "Vv agner

took title to the Utah County property as a Bona Fide Purchaser for value. Id. at 11.
The remainder of section IV will demonstrate that the trial court correctly ruled that the

Amended Complaint sought a money judgment only, not title to real property and a lis pendens
is not valid as to a money judgment; 2) a lis pendens has no independent legal significance; and
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3) a lis pendens does not give rise to a duty to investigate beyond the pleadings. In the end,
section IV will show that Wagner was a BFP and the Lis Pendens was not effective to put him on
notice.
A.

The Third Amended Complaint Only Sought a Money Judgment and a Lis Pendens
is not Valid as to a Money Judgment
A lis pendens is not effective with regard to a money judgment and therefore Plaintiffs

Lis Pendens was not effective. In Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint (Complaint), Plaintiffs
set forth seven claims for relief: 1) conversion by Defendant Thomas, 2) receipt of stolen
property, 3) concealment of stolen property, 4) conversion by Defendant Beisinger, 5) trespass to
chattels, 6) breach of fiduciary duty, and 7) constructive trust. It is the seventh claim for relief
which is in issue here. This claim is found in paragraphs 41 and 41 of the Complaint and reads:
41. By virtue of the removal of 1st Western Corp. And National Fidelity Inc.'s property,
a constructive trust should be created over the corporate assets to prevent Thomas'
improper use of the assets.
42. The Court should determine the true ownership of said assets and deduce that they
are subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiff s.
R.975-76. Nowhere in the Complaint is real property mentioned.2 As stated in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-40-2 (1995) the recording of a lis pendens is authorized only in actions affecting real
property. This section reads:
In any action affecting the title to, or the right to possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and defendant a the time
of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any
time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the
property or some part thereof is situated notice of pendency of the action. ..

Paragraph G, Prayer for Relief, of Third Amended Complaint Reads:
G. For Judgment on Plaintiffs Seventh Claim for Relief against Defendant Kelly Thomas
for damages in the amount to be proven at trial, but in any case, at least $850,000.00 plus
punitive damages in the sum or $1,000,000.00.
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(Emphasis added). Plaintiffs did not mention "title to, or the right to possession of, real
property" in the Complaint. Id. In fact, the Complaint sought a money judgment only. 3 Thus,
the I is I *ei idens \ vas i lot effective to put It iterv enors 01 11 lotice.
The conclusion that the Lis Pendens in ineffective because the Complaint sought money
damages only is consistent with a United States District Court, District of Utah decision.

T

1

Bushf. Doydi », 1 U 13 R 432 (D. "I Itah 1992) the com t stated that a lis pendens is impropei if the
complaint seeks only money damages. Judge Benson stated:
. . . that the filing of a lis pendens was improper in this case. Plaintiff did not
allege the existence of an equitable lien in his Complaint. The Complaint seeks
monetary damages only. Utah law does not allow for the filing of lis pendens in
cases seeking a money judgment.
Citing Hamilton v. Smith, 808 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (under Utah law civil
rights plaintiff seeking monetai ;; • damages is restrained froi i i filii ig lis pendens) See also W inters
v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah App. 1999) (lis pendens invalid because complaint and
decree did not address title to or possession of real property). The case law supports the
conclusion that a lis pendens is not effective as to a money judgment.
In sum, the trial court properly concluded that the Lis Pendens did not impart notice to
Intervenors because Plaintiffs sought only money damages; the Lis Pendens had no effect.
B.

Lis Pendens has no Independent Legal Significance Apart From Pleadings
A lis pendens has no significance apart from the pleadings. This simply means that the

In order to impose a constructive trust over real property, Plaintiff must have specifically identified ific
real property as the res of the constructive trust. See Amtitle Trust Company v. Fitch, 541 P.2d 1166, 1168
(Ariz. App. 1975); Aebig v. Commercial Bank of Seattle, 614 P.2d 696, 697 (Wash. App. 1984).
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to the lis pendens. In Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, (Utah 1979) the Supreme Court of Utah
held:
The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis pendens is to give constructive notice
of the pendency of the proceeding; its only foundation is the action filed - it has
no existence independent of it.
***

. . . the effect of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of all the facts
apparent on the face of the pleadings, the recordation of a notice of lis pendens is,
in effect, a republication of the pleadings.
Id. at 190 (emphasis added). This is significant because of the deficiencies in the Third
Amended Complaint; the Complaint did not mention real property, and therefore the Plaintiffs
Lis Pendens had no "foundation." Id. The Lis Pendens cannot republish something that was
never published. See also Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Company, 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978)
(lis pendens is a republication of the pleadings); See also 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 33 (1987) (a lis
pendens " . . . is notice of every fact contained in the pleadings or apparent on the face of the
proceedings... a lis pendens does not extend beyond the prayer for relief). The Lis Pendens
did not put Intervenors on constructive notice that the Utah County property was a subject of
litigation. If wagner had no notice, then he was a BFP. If Wagner was a BFP, then he took title
free of any title defects.
C.

There is no Duty to Investigate Beyond the Face of the Pleadings
Utah law does not require one to go beyond the pleadings to aggressively investigate

ambiguities in the pleadings. Thus, Intervenors had no duty to conduct an independent
investigation to determine whether the oblique reference to "assets" in paragraphs 41 and 42 in
the Third Amended Complaint referred to the Utah County Property. Utah law imposes on a
subsequent purchaser for value a requirement to " . . . show that he had no actual notice, i.e., no
28

personal knowledge, of a prior conveyance or that the prior conveyance did not impart
constructive notice, i.e. was not recorded before his conveyance in the same land was recorded."
Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Savings and Loan Assoc 739 P 2d 1133 1136 (I Jtal ) \pp
1987); See also Utah Code Ann. 57-3-3 (1986). Intervenors produced evidence that they had no
personal knowledge of pending litigation involving the Utah County property.
rsified Equities makes clear tl lat the "acti lal notice exc< - •

••

:' a

\SJSJC?-

party dealing with the land has information or facts which would put a prudent person upon an
inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the titk

Id j | 11 >6

icitiiijj lohnstw t" Hell, 666 P.2d 308, j i u ^utah 1983). I hus, a party may be charged with a
duty to inquire, but such a question is one which

turns on questions of fact." JJ at

Here, even if these facts suggests that Intervenors should have inquired more, it is :. i'

-'
once

their inquiry began, they would not have discovered anything because there was nothing in the
pleadings and the trial court's file that mentioned the Utah County property. Finally, Judge
On ne ii i Divei sifted Equities noted:
A duty of inquiry requires the party to make inquiry and to diligently do that
which the answer to the inquiry prompts. . . But a duty to inquire is not a duty to
disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set straight.
i(

. isis added) In: i tl le pi esent ca se Intel \ ei lors had it 10 cii it> to "disbelieve"

the pleadings or to "aggressively investigate."
In sum, Intervenors acted as like a prudent individual would in this situation ar;.
law does not require more of them. The effect of their prudence is to make them bona fide
purchasers for value. If Intervenors are BFPs then the Lis Pendens, filed before the conveyance
from. Defendants to Intervenors, did not pui ilicin on IN »iia ihut I he pmperts v\us the sub|w t of
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the litigation. If the Lis Pendens did not put them on notice, then the Lis Pendens had no effect
on the conveyance to Intervenors. The Lis Pendens was ineffective and Wagner was a BFP.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Intervenors moved
timely to intervene. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. The trial court also correctly ruled that Intervenors had standing to
raise all relevant arguments in defense of their interests in the Utah County property. Finally, the
trial court correctly ruled that the Lis Pendens did not put Intervenors on constructive notice
regarding the pending litigation. Intervenors respectfully submit that the trial court decision be
affirmed.
DATED this^21 day of October, 1999.

J&THOMAS W. SEILER (2910)
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, L.C.
Attorney for Mt. West Title/Appellant
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
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A.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4

7

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

aside default judgment granted by trial court.
Bawden & Assocs. v. Smith, 624 P.2d 676
(Utah 1981).
Cited in State v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79, 493
P.2d 604 (1972); State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760

Rule 4

(Utah 1984); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245
(Utah 1988); Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449
(Utah 1989); Rimensburger v. Rimensburger,
841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
§ 143; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
352; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 8, 9.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 54 et seq.; 71
CJ.S. Pleading §§ 408 to 412; 72 C.J.S. Process § 3.
A.L.R. — What constitutes doing business

within state for purposes of state "closed-door"
statute barring unqualified or unregistered
foreign corporation from local courts — modern
cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 466.
Key Numbers. — Courts •=> 21 et seq.;
Pleading *=» 331; Process «=» 4 to 6.

Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and
served.
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.
(c) Contents of summons.
(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the county in which it is
brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and
telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the
plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time within
which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that
the complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed
with the court within ten days of service.
(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall
state that the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed
within 10 days after service and shall state the telephone number of the
clerk of the court where the defendant may call at least 13 days after
service to determine if the complaint has been filed.
(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state
the subject matter and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and
that the complaint is on file.
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or
constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the
marshars deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney.
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2),
(3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons
and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process;

B.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59

Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

collected through attachment proceeding,
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110,86 P. 805 (1906).
Vacation of satisfaction.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien

170

of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V.
Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 1004 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Harmless error not
ground for new trial, Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

C.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60

Rule 60

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.LR.3d 335
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence ofjudge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motionfornew trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 AX.R.4th 1170.
j ^ ^^ w a i V er as binding on later state
c ^ v jj ^ ^ j 43 A.L.R.4th 747.
C o u r t ^porter's death or disability prior to
^ ^ 1 ^ n o t e s as grounds for reversal or
*, A L R 4 t h 1 0 4 9
new ^
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
^ ^
new ^
d Qn
d
rf
°
, _ °
r ,
C A T 1 j . . ,
of d a m a e s
modern ca8e8 5 A L R
<£*<*
8 ~
> - - 5th
„"
,
r
J Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of seaman m
actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employer8, Liability Act (45 USCS
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial *» 13 et seq.,
HO, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 590)); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for

D.

Utah Code Annotated 25-5-1

FRAUD
.jlishment a n d enhancement of nonldlife management areas that are manwith Section 23-14-18;
ad ecosystem research; and
ration, development, and promotion of the

Section
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.
25-5-6.

a the sale of Wildlife Heritage certificates
ergency feeding of wildlife.
1993

25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

. Heritage Account — Contents — Use
[ monies.
ited a restricted account within the General
Wildlife Heritage Account.

te

s of the account shall consist of:
» from the sale of Wildlife Heritage certifie s received for the Wildlife Heritage prot accrued on account monies.
the account shall be used as provided in
fe Board shall report to the 1994 Legislature
j and programs developed.
1993

TITLE 24
STRY AND FIRE CONTROL
[REPEALED]

*nt Conveyances [Repealed].
lerchandise in Bulk [Repealed!.
nd Sales of Livestock [Repealed].
Qg Wool [Repealed].
of Frauds.
1 Fraudulent Transfer Act.
CHAPTER 1
3ULENT CONVEYANCES [REPEALED]
1988

CHAPTER 2
F MERCHANDISE IN BULK [REPEALED]
5-2-5.

Repealed.

1965

CHAPTER 3
i AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK [REPEALED]
25-3-4.

Repealed.

1965

CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL [REPEALED]
25-4-3.

Repealed.
CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other t h a n leases for
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
1953

25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power of
a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will and
testament; nor to prevent any trust from arising or being
extinguished by implication or operation of law.
1995
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
1953

FRAUD

Repealed.

Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
Representation as to credit of third person.
Promise to answer for obligation of another —
When not required to be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.

TITLE 25

-1-16.

~AUmu~x

1965

25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and
signed.
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing,
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making of the agreement;
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another;
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises
to marry;
(4) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own
estate;
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation;
(6) every credit agreement.
(a) As used in Subsection (6):
(i) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by
a financial institution to lend, delay, or otherwise
modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or
things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to
make any other financial accommodation.
"Credit agreement" does not include the usual
and customary agreements related to deposit
accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated
with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution
which extends credit or extends a financial accommodation under a credit agreement with a
debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or
obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial

E.

Utah Code Annotated 78-40-2

78-40-2

JUDICIAL CODE

78-40-2. Lis pendens.
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property
the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such
answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the
county m which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of the
pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the property m that county affected
thereby From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser
or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against
parties designated by their real names
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-40-2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Federal lawsuit.
The propnety of filing a notice of lis pendens
from a federal lawsuit is a matter governed by
state law Hamilton v Smith, 808 F 2d 36
(10th Cir 1986)

ANALYSIS

Divorce action
Effect pending appeal
Federal lawsuit
Proof of lack of notice
Purpose
Slander of title
Divorce action.
A wife was entitled to file a notice of lis pendens with respect to property whose title would
be affected by a pending divorce action, but the
notice would not be effective where third-party
rights had arisen subsequent to the execution
of quitclaim deeds by the wife m compliance
with a prior divorce decree if the third party
has no actual notice Boyce v Boyce, 609 P 2d
928 (Utah 1980)
Effect pending appeal.
The recording of lis pendens is effective after
judgment and pending appeal to give constructive notice of the pendency of proceedings
which may affect the title or right of possession
of the owner of the real property involved Hidden Meadows Dev Co v Mills, 590 P 2d 1244
(Utah 1979)
Failure to furnish a supersedeas bond pending appeal has no effect on the notice given by
a recorded lis pendens during the time after
judgment and pending appeal
Hidden
Meadows Dev Co v Mills, 590 P2d 1244
(Utah 1979)

Proof of lack of notice.
The fact that a deed was dated two weeks
before the recording of the notice of lis pendens
did not constitute conclusive proof that the
grantee took without notice of claims to property, since the deed was recorded a week after
the lis pendens notice Harvey v Sanders, 534
P 2d 905 (Utah 1975)
Purpose.
The sole purpose of recording a lis pendens is
to give constructive notice of the pendency of
proceedings which might be derogatory to the
owner's title or right of possession, its only
foundation is the action filed, and it has no
existence independent of that Hansen v
Kohler, 550 P 2d 186 (Utah 1976)
Slander of title.
The recording of a lis pendens, which serves
as constructive notice of the pendency of an
action, is in effect a republication of the pleadings in the underlying action, as such it is an
absolutely privileged publication, and cannot
become the basis of an action for slander of
title Hansen v Kohler, 550 P 2d 186 (Utah
1976)
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Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978)
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William D. BLODGETT and Florence G.
Blodgett, his wife, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
Joe MARTSCH, Betty Purcell, aka Betty
Purcell Martsch, Doyle Nease, Raco Car
Wash Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation,
Wayne A. Ashworth, Trustee, Karl W.
Tenny, Valley Bank & Trust Company, a
Utah banking corporation, First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., State of Utah
and John Does 1 through 10, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 15608.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 26, 1978.
Former owners of land brought action
against trustees under deed of trust and
others to recover for alleged fraud arising
out of the public sale of the property. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, J., granted summary judgment for defendants and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held
that: (1) evidence was sufficient to permit
a finding that the trustee was in a confidential relationship with the trustor and
had breached that relationship; (2) successor trustee was not shown to have met
statutory requirements with respect to publication and posting notice of the sales, and
(3) purchaser of the land was not shown to
be a bona fide purchaser.
Reversed and remanded.
Ellett, C. J., concurred in the result.
Crockett, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Hall, J., filed an opinion concurring
with reservations in which Wilkins, J., concurred.
1. Appeal and Error e=>863, 1024.4
In reviewing the record on the appeal
from summary judgment, court treats the
statements and evidentiary materials of the
appellant as if a jury would receive them as

the only credible evidence and the court
sustains the judgment only if no issue of
fact which could affect the outcome can be
discerned. (Per Maughan, J., with one Justice concurring in the result, one Justice
concurring specially, and two Justices concurring with reservation.)
2. Fraud <s=»49
In the absence of a confidential relationship, plaintiff seeking to recover on the
theory of fraud must prove that defendant
knowingly misrepresented a material fact
with the intent to induce the plaintiffs to
act or refrain from action and that the
plaintiff, reasonably relying on the misrepresentation, acted or failed to act to his
detriment. (Per Maughan, J., with one Justice concurring in the result, one Justice
concurring specially, and two Justices concurring with reservation.)
3. Fraud e=>7
If the circumstances are such that the
defendant could exercise extraordinary influence over the plaintiff and defendant
was or should have been aware that plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the
defendant and reasonably relied on the defendant's guidance, the parties are in a
"confidential relationship" and the plaintiff's burden in Ifcase of fraud is considerably diminished. (Per Maughan, J., with one
Ju^ticeTconcurring in the result, one Justice
concurring specially, and two Justices concurring with reservation.)
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Fraud s=>50, 64(1)
Whether litigants are in a confidential
relationship at the time of the transactions
about which they litigate is ordinarily a
question of fact and is not to be found on
the basis of mere friendship or social or
religious affiliation between the parties;
there are a few relationships, such as parent-child, attorney-client, and trustee-cestui
which the law presumes to be confidential.
(Per Maughan, J., with one Justice concurring in the result, one Justice concurring
specially, and two Justices concurring with
reservation.)
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5. Mortgages <s=>209
The duty of the trustee under a trust
deed is greater than the mere obligation to
sell the pledged property in accordance with
the default provision of the trust deed instrument; it is a duty to treat the trustor
fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor. (Per Maughan, J., with one
Justice concurring in the result, one Justice
concurring specially, and two Justices concurring with reservation.)
6. Fraud e=>4
Breach of duty by the dominant party
in a confidential relationship may be regarded as "constructive fraud;" it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to show an intent to
defraud as constructive fraud is an equitable doctrine employed by the courts to rectify injury resulting from breach of obligations implicit in the relationship. (Per
Maughan, J., with one Justice concurring in
the result, one Justice concurring specially,
and two Justices concurring with reservation.)
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
7. Fraud <s=>58(l)
Evidence was sufficient to permit a
finding that bank which was acting in trust
under deed of trust was in a confidential
relationship with trustors, who claimed that
they were defrauded by the bank in the
manner in which it handled the foreclosure.
(Per Maughan, J., with one Justice concurring in the result, one Justice concurring
specially, and two Justices concurring with
reservation.)
8. Mortgages <s=>209
Bank's silence as to the trust deed's
contents at the time of closing, at the time
of prepayment of the first loan, and at the
time of public sale did not constitute a
discharge of the bank's duties to the original landowner as a matter of law; reasonable diligence on the part of a trustee, where
the trustor proclaims his confusion about
the meaning of the instruments he is asked
to sign, may require a full disclosure and
explanation, particularly where the instruments impose a heavier burden than the

trustor-signed documents in the trustee's
hands authorize. (Per Maughan, J., with
one Justice concurring in the result, one
Justice concurring specially, and two Justices concurring with reservation.)
9. Mortgages <s=>209
Trustee's duty to trustors after he became trustee under the deed was to act
with reasonable diligence and good faith on
behalf of the trustors consistent with his
primary obligation to assure the payment of
the secured debt. (Per Maughan, J., with
one Justice concurring in the result, one
Justice concurring specially, and two Justices concurring with reservation.)
10. Mortgages «=>360
Evidence that trustee under deed of
trust failed to post sale notices where required, that he misdescribed the tracts and
the notices that he did post, and that he did
not inquire as to the trustors' preference
about joint or sequential sale demonstrated
that the trustee had not performed his statutory duties. (Per Maughan, J., with one
Justice concurring in the result, one Justice
concurring specially, and two Justices concurring with reservation.) U.C.A.1953, 571-25, 57-1-27.
11. Mortgages <s=*372(3)
Bona fide purchaser at a public sale
under a trust deed may rely on the recitals
in the deed he receives from the trustee
after the sale and the sale can not be set
aside because of irregularities in the publication or posting of notice. (Per Maughan,
J., with one Justice concurring in the result,
one Justice concurring specially, and two
Justices concurring with reservation.) U.C.
A.1953, 57-1-25, 57-1-27.
12. Mortgages <s=>372(l)
Purchaser of land at public sale who
had been an insider in the corporation
whose default on loan had given rise to the
public sale under a deed of trust and who
was married to the president of that corporation was not a bona fide purchaser entitled to rely on the recitals of the deed
issued by the trustee. (Per Maughan, J.,
with one Justice concurring in the result,
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one Justice concurring specially, and two
Justices concurring with reservation.)
13. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>220
"Bona fide purchaser" is one who takes
without actual or constructive knowledge of
facts sufficient to put him on notice of the
complainant's equity. (Per Maughan, J.,
with one Justice concurring in the result,
one Justice concurring specially, and two
Justices concurring with reservation.)
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
Joseph Rust of Kirton, McConkie, Boyer
& Boyle, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and
appellants.
Harry D. Pugsley, Donald Sawaya, Irving
H. Biele, Lorin N. Pace, John P. Ashton,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
The Blodgetts here appeal from summary
judgment of no cause of action on their
complaint alleging fraud in transactions
which culminated in the public sale of the
Blodgetts' property at a price allegedly
about one-eighth its appraisal or actual value. The public sale was effected pursuant
to a trust deed. The Blodgetts allege they
were unaware the major part of the property so sold was included in the trust deed
description, and their ignorance is attributable to the trustee's misrepresentation and
breach of duty to inform them about the
contents of the deed.
[1] In reviewing the record on any appeal from summary judgment, we treat the
statements and evidentiary materials of the
appellant as if a jury would receive them as
the only credible evidence, and we sustain
the judgment only if no issues of fact which
could affect the outcome can be discerned.
Viewed in that light, the record supports
the following statement of facts.
In 1969, the Blodgetts were the owners of
two tracts of land located at approximately
6100 South on Highland Drive in Salt Lake
County. On the larger tract (the "store

tract") they operated a grocery store. The
smaller tract "car-wash tract") was adjacent to the store tract and was not utilized
by the Blodgetts until they leased it to Raco
Car Wash Systems, Inc. ("Raco") for the
installation of a car wash facility in early
1969. The lease instrument provided that
the Blodgetts would permit the car-wash
tract to be pledged as security for a loan
Raco required to finance the car wash installation.
Raco, acting through its president, Betty
Purcell, made arrangements for the loan
with Respondent Valley Bank & Trust
Company (the "Bank") with which the
Blodgetts had a significant previous business history as borrowers and depositors.
On November 5,1971, at about 5:30 p. m.
the Blodgetts attended the Raco loan closing at the Bank's office. They intended to
execute documents necessary for the hypothecation of the car-wash tract alone, although they recognized an access easement
over the store tract was involved. The only
commitment the Blodgetts had made until
the moment of closing was the one contained in the Raco lease instrument, of
which the Bank had a copy. Without the
Blodgetts' knowledge, the Bank had advised
Raco it required stronger security than the
car-wash tract alone, had been advised by
Raco the Blodgetts would pledge the store
tract as well, and had prepared for the
Blodgetts' execution a trust deed which
conveyed both the car-wash tract and the
store tract. In addition, without first discussing the matter with either Raco or the
Blodgetts, the Bank had prepared a note for
signature by the Blodgetts as co-makers,
even though the Blodgetts' signature on the
note was not necessary to satisfy any internal requirement of the Bank or any external requirement of regulatory authority.
Although the Bank usually explained
loan documents to borrowers unless they
demonstrated some degree of sophistication,
the Bank in this case offered the Blodgetts
no explanation of the trust deed contents
and, in particular, failed to call attention to
the trust deed's departure from the concept
of the Raco-Blodgett lease. Bank personnel
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spent some half hour explaining the loan
documents to Ms. Purcell (although neither
she nor her corporation was making any
contribution to the real property collateral),
but made no similar effort to inform the
Blodgetts. This was so even though the
Blodgetts announced they did not understand the loan documents. When the Blodgetts asked about the note, the Bank-falsery
advised thejm they assumed only a secondary or "stand-by" obligation by signing it.
The Blodgetts requested copies of all the
loan documents, but the Bank sent them a
copy of the note only.
Raco defaulted on the secured note. After the loan was consummated, but before
the trustee undertook sale of the Blodgett
tracts, the Blodgetts satisfied (by $20,000.00
prepayment) a loan which was secured by
the store tract and which predated the Raco
loan. The Bank did not then call the Blodgetts attention to a remaining encumbrance
on the store tract or suggest the tract was
in jeopardy.
By the time proceedings were instituted
for public sale of the Blodgett tracts, Respondent Wayne Ashworth had been substituted for the Bank as trustee. The substitution was effected in compliance with statute and with actual notice to the Blodgetts.
There is no showing that Ashworth knew of
the non-disclosures of the Bank, or of its
unauthorized inclusion of the store tract, in
the trust deed.
In effecting the public sale of the Blodgett tracts, Ashworth failed to comply with
the statute (Section 57-1-25) which prescribes the procedure for public notice.
Both the published and posted notices failed
to identify the property in that two calls
were omitted from the description, and only
two of the notices were posted in the precinct where the tracts lie.
The Blodgetts were present at the public
sale and so were Ashworth and the Bank.
In the course of the sale proceedings, the
Blodgetts, by reason of their misconception
that only the car-wash tract was subject to
sale, failed to take the most elementary

kinds of self-interest action. For example,
although our statute (57-1-27) requires the
trustee, where two or more tracts are being
sold under a trust deed, to follow the trustors direction with regard to joint sale or
sequential sales of the tracts, the Blodgetts
did not request the sale of the car-wash
tract (which alone had a value in excess of
the secured debt) as a first and separate
transaction. Moreover, the Blodgetts did
not enter the bidding for the combined
tracts even though the high bid was a barely significant fraction of their value. Neither Ashworth nor the Bank consulted with,
advised, or sought instruction from the
Blodgetts before or during the public sale.
Both acted purely in the Bank's interest
and took the course of action most likely to
assure that the Bank would either be paid in
full or acquire the tracts at a bargain price.
The high bidder at the public sale was Respondent Joe Martsch. Martsch had been a
director of Raco (now defunct) during its
operative years, and was married to Betty
Purcell at the time of the sale.
The deed by which Ashworth conveyed
the Blodgett tracts to Martsch falsely
recited that all statutory requirements for
public sale had been satisfied. Martsch in
fact paid $30,000 for the deed. The Blodgetts first became aware that the store
tract had been included in the sale when
Martsch asserted his rights of ownership
after the sale.
[2] The Blodgetts first seek relief
against the Bank and Ashworth on the basis of fraud and abuse of confidential relationship. The elements of a fraud action
have frequently been stated by this Court.1
The plaintiff must, in the absence of confidential relationship, prove the defendant
knowingly misrepresented a material fact
with intent to induce the plaintiff to act or
refrain from action and that the plaintiff,
reasonably relying on the misrepresentation, acted (or failed to act) to his detriment.

Stuck v. Delta L & W Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 P. 791; Guaranty Mtg. Co. v. Flint, 66 Utah 128,
240 P. 175.
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[3] If the circumstances are such that
the defendant could exercise extraordinary
influence over the plaintiff and the defendant was or should have been aware the
plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the
defendant and reasonably relied on defendant's guidance, then the parties are said to
be in "confidential relationship" and the
plaintiff's burden is considerably diminishe d ^ A course ofjdealing between persons
m situateSTTs watched with extreme jeal/ousy and solicitude, and if there is found
the slightest trace of undue influence or
unfair advantage, redress will be given to
the injured party." 2
[4] Whether litigants were in confidential relationship at the time of the transactions about which they litigate is ordinarily
a question of fact and is not to be found on
the basis of mere friendship or social or
religious affiliation between the parties.3
There are a few relationships (such as parent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui)
which the law presumes to be confidential.
The relationship which arises when a borrower secures his loan by trust deed has
been the subject of considerable judicial
comment. Among cases which have declared the trustee under a deed of trust to
be in fiduciary relationship with the trustor
are Furst v. Loftin, 29 N.CApp. 248, 224
S.E.2d 641 (1976), Spires v. Edgar, 513
S.W.2d 372 (Mo.1974), Woodworth v. iiedwood Empire Savings & Loan Assn., 22
Cal.App.3d 347, 99 CaLRptr. 373 (1971), and
Feldman v. Rucker, 201 Va. 11, 109 S.E.2d
379.
[5] The duty of the trustee under a
trust deed is greater than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default provision of the trust
deed instrument, it is a duty to^treat the
trustor fairly and in^accordance with a high
punctilio of honor. In discussing the difference between the duties of a mortgagee and
the trustee under a trust deed, the Court of
2. 37 Am.Jur.2d 38, Fraud and Deceit, § 15.
3. Thatcher v. Peterson, 20 Utah 2d 290, 437
P.2d 213.

Appeals of District of Columbia in Spruill v.
Ballard, 61 App.D.C. 112, 58 F.2d 517, made
this statement:
The practice of securing money by deed
of trust on real estate is the nearly universal method in effect in the District of
Columbia. The ease and facility of foreclosure under it commends it over the
more cumbersome form of mortgage
which must be foreclosed in court, but
this very fact imposes upon courts the
duty of scrutinizing all sales had under it
which are questioned, and of setting
those aside in which fraud or overreaching has been practiced by the trustee. In Church Inv. v. Holmes, 60 App.
D.C. 27, 46 F.2d 608, we said a trustee
named in a deed of trust to secure a loan
sustains a fiduciary relation to the debtor
as well as the creditor, .
[6] The breach of duty by the dominant
party in a confidential relationship may be
regarded as constructive fraud. It js_un^
necessjuxfor.the plaintifF?o showman jntent
to^defraud; constructive fraud is an equita-1
ble doctrine employed by the courts to recti- I
fy injury resulting from breach of the obli- \
gations implicit in the relationship.4
—y
[7] In this case, there is more upon
which to predicate confidential relationship
between the Blodgetts and the Bank than
the mere utilization of trust deed in the
loan transaction. The Blodgetts had been
long time customers of the Bank and had
previously borrowed on the security of the
store tract. They were not strangers at the
Raco loan closing. Finally, there is room
for inference that trust companies, if they
use the trust deed mechanism with no intent to be protective of borrowers, exploit
the euphoria engendered by the word
"trust." The statute permits only entities
with credentials of trustworthiness to act as
"trustees," 5 and the instrument of transfer
is denominated a "trust" deed. It may not
be generally understood by those who con4. Carnes v. Meador, 553 S.W. 365 (Tex. 1975);
Vogt v. Town & Country Realty of Lincoln, 194
Neb. 308, 231 N.W.2d 496 (1975).
5. 57-1-21, U.C.A., 1953 as amended.
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vey by trust deed that the only entity to
which thejrustee feels fiduciary obligation
is itself.
The Bank, in seeking summary judgment,
asserted that none_of its personnel made
any representation, false or otherwise,
about the content of the trust deed the
Blodgetts signed. Any claimed false representation related to the nature of the obligation the Blodgetts assumed, by signing
the note, and is not material, because the
public sale of Blodgetts' property would
have taken place in the same way if the
Blodgetts had never signed the note in any
capacity.
[8] We cannot agree the Bank's silence
about the trust deed's contents at the Raco
loan closing, at the time of the prepayment
of the first Blodgett loan, and at the time
of the public sale constituted a discharge of
the Bank's duties as a matter of law if the
facts are indeed as the record would permit
a jury to find. Reasonable diligence on the
part of a trustee, where the trustor proclaims his confusion about the meaning of
the instruments he is asked to sign, may
require a full disclosure and explanation,
particularly where the instruments impose
a heavier burden than trustor-signed documents in the trustee's hands authorize. We
have already noted the other occasions
when the Bank may have had a duty to
speak.
[9,10] As to Respondent Ashworth, his
duty to the Blodgetts after he became trustee was to act with reasonable diligence and
good_faith on their behalf consistent with
his primary obligation to assure the payment of the secured debt. He had certain
clear statutory duties with regard to (1)
advertisement of the sale (Sec. 57-1-25)
and (2) deference to the Blodgetts' preference as to the joint or sequential sale of the
tracts (Sec. 57-1-27). It can hardly be said
that Ashworth satisfied those obligations as
a matter of law. The only evidence in the
record is that he failed to post sale notices
where required, that the posted notices mis-

described the tracts, and that he did not
inquire as to the Blodgetts' preference
about joint or sequjentialsale, let alone defer to that preference.
[11] Our statutes protect a bona fide
purchaser at a public sale under a trust
deed, by permitting him to rely on the
recitals in the deed he receives from the
trustee after the sale. Such a sale cannot
be set aside because of irregularities in the
publication or posting of notice.
Ashworth may satisfy a jury that he acted appropriately. On the record before us
however, there is an issue of fact whether
Ashworth exercised reasonable diligence to
protect the trustor's interests in the procedures incident to the public sale.
[12,13] As to defendant Martsch, the
evidence before us does not lead to the
conclusion he qualified as a bona fide purchlSerTso as txTbe entitled to rely on the
recitals of the deed issued by the trustee;
after the public sale. A bona fide purchaser is one who takes without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to
put him on notice of the complainant's equity.6
The end result of the legal maneuvers in
this case is that a Raco insider, for merely
satisfying a debt which was primarily
Raco's now claims, free of any Blodgett
equity, the^proceeds from condemnation of
the car "wash tract by the State of Utah
(and such proceeds exceed the price paid at
the sale), and further claims the store tract
which has significantly greater value. We
cannot agree that Martsch, by virtue of his
association with Raco and Purcell, could not
be found to have had at least constructive
knowledge of the fact that the Blodgetts
were unaware the store tract was being
sold.
While the transfer to the State of Utah
as the result of condemnation cannot now
be set aside, the equitable remedies associ-

6. Orso v Cater, 272 Ala 657, 133 So 2d 864, Sieger v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Cal.App.2d 649,
318 P.2d 479.
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ated with unjust enrichment7 are not foreclosed to the Blodgetts as against Martsch
on the facts revealed by the record, nor is
restoration of the Blodgetts* title to the
store tract beyond the court's powers if title
is found not to be in a bona fide purchaser.
Summary judgment being inappropriate
on the state of the record, the matter is
remanded for trial as against Martsch, Ashworth, and the Bank. With regard to the
Blodgetts' action against the State of Utah,
however, summary judgment is affirmed.
Discovery has revealed no basis for confidential relationship between the Blodgetts
and the State or for questioning the State's
bona fides or for a finding that the State
has been unjustly enriched.

fact, and draw inferences and conclusions of
law therefrom to support its judgment, I do
not adopt the "statement of facts" set forth
in the main opinion except to the extent
necessary to support the Court's conclusion
that issues of fact are present requiring a
trial.
WILKINS, Justice, concurs in the views
expressed in the concurring opinion of
HALL, J.

( o I K^NUMBER^STE^

ELLETT, C. J., concurs in result.
CROCKETT, J., concurs by separate opinion.
HALL, J., concurs with reservation by
separate opinion.
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring):
I concur with the main opinion and also
with the comments of Justice Hall: that we
should not presume to evaluate nor draw
conclusions from the evidence, but that
should be done at the trial.
HALL, Justice (concurring with reservation):
Summary judgment is a ruling of the
court as a matter of law and is only appropriate when no genuine issue of material
fact exists.
I agree that summary judgment was not
proper in this case because of the existence
of the various issues of fact noted in the
main opinion that may only be determined
by a fact-finder. Consequently, I concur in
reversing and remanding for trial on the
issues that exist with respect to the claim of
Martsch, Ashworth and the Bank.
It being the prerogative of the fact-finder to hear the evidence, make findings of

Craig MECHAM and John Hedman,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Myron L. BENSON and Ellen Benson,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 15649.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 2, 1979.
Sellers brought action against buyers
on a mobile home sales contract for unpaid
balance of purchase price. Buyers counterclaimed charging fraud in inducement. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
James S. Sawaya, J., entered judgment,
which was pursuant to a jury verdict of no
cause of action on sellers' complaint and
which awarded buyers return of their down
payment, plus attorney fees, and sellers appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J.,
held that: (1) on basis of unchallenged instructions, jury could find that buyers were
fraudulently induced, made timely rescission, and, by permitting repossession, tendered back what they had received under
contract; (2) under circumstances, sellers,

7. 66 Am.Jur.2d 945, Restitution and Implied Contracts, Sec. 3, Restatement of Restitution,
Sec. 1 et seq.
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the decision on rehearing. Thus, so long as
the garnishment lien attaches to funds belonging to the debtor before the mortgagee
takes the action required to enforce its rent
assignment, the mortgagee loses those
funds to the judgment creditor. While the
mortgagee was able to gain priority to
rents coming due in the future, it was not
able to gain priority to accrued rents attached by the garnishment before the mortgagee took enforcement steps. Consequently, contrary to Balcor's assertion,
Farmers Union shows that Kansas law
does, not permit perfection of a rent assignment to be completely effective against an
entity that acquires rights in the rents before the date of enforcement, i.e., the mortgagee has no right to vitiate retroactively
the lien of the garnishing judgment creditor. Although it is true that § 546(b)
"merely requires that state law 'permit[]
perfection of an interest in property to be
effective against an entity that acquires
rights in such property before the date of
such perfection/ " (Balcor brief at 10, emphasis in original), state law in this instance does not permit a mortgagee's interest in rents to defeat the garnishor's right
to accrued rents attached by the garnishment This Court believes § 546(b) applies
only when state law allows the perfection
of a creditor's lien to relate back against all
claims to all property subject to the lien,
not just against claims to property to be
acquired by the debtor in the future. The
trustee, exercising under § 544(a)(2) the
same rights as the garnishing judgment
creditor in Farmers Union, thus has rights
to the rents as of the date of filing against
which the mortgagee's rights are ineffective. Since Kansas law does not permit
Balcor's lien to defeat (be effective against)
nishing judgment creditor as of the filing
date, § 546(b) is not available to Balcor.

United Savings v. Timbers oflnwood For*
est, 484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d
740 (1988), an undersecured creditor like
Balcor is not entitled to be protected
against the losses that are caused by the
forced delay in realizing on its collateral
while the bankruptcy is pending, just
against any diminution in the value of the
property during that time.
For these reasons, just as in Glessner,
the Court concludes Balcor's interest in the
debtor's rents was not perfected under
Kansas law as of the date the debtor filed
for bankruptcy as required to withstand
the trustee's avoiding power under
§ 544(a)(2), and consequently, the post-petition rents are not Balcor's cash collateral
The foregoing constitutes Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law under Rule
7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure and Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

James H. BUSCH, Plaintiff,
v.
James DOYLE, Defendant.
Civ. No. 90-C-704B.
United States District Court,
D. Utah, CD.
April 10, 1992.

action claiming that employer failed to pay
monthly compensation and percentage of
[5, 6] As the Court pointed out in Gless- gross profits received from sale or exner, all that this ruling will do to Balcor is change of land. The District Court, Bendelay recovery of its money. If the debtor son, J., held that: (1) Rule 11 sanctions for
fails in its reorganization efforts, Balcor filing counterclaim which was addressed in
will be able to foreclose on the property stipulation to bankruptcy settlement agreeand collect the rents while that foreclosure ment were not warranted; (2) triable issues
is pending, if it can satisfy the require- of fact existed as to whether employer's
ments of state law to do so. As held in payment of money on promissory note to
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court rather than to employee was sufficient to make funds available to employee;
^d (3) employer was not entitled to exclude documents exchanged between employer and attorney on grounds of attorney-client privilege.
Ordered accordingly.
1. Bankruptcy <s=>2187
Employer's stipulation in bankruptcy
proceedings brought by employee that he
would not seek or make any claim against
employee in connection with filing of involuntary petition did not mean that Rule 11
sanctions were appropriate where employer
filed counterclaim in separate action, as
scope of bankruptcy settlement agreement
and extent to which it prohibited subsequent claims was unsettled matter; it was
not shown that counterclaim was filed in
bad faith or in violation of Rule 11. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 11, 41(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <£=*2486
There were genuine issues of material
fact, precluding summary judgment for
employer, as to whether payments employer had made to employee were to be applied toward promissory notes or were intended to pay off other obligations.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>2488
There was a genuine issue of material
fact, precluding summary judgment for
employee, as to whether it was necessary
for employee to place promissory notes in
hands of attorney for collection, reasonableness of attorney fees, possible failure
of employee to mitigate damages and
whether delay in payment on note was
solely due to employer's depositing money
with registry of clerk of court.
4. Federal Civil Procedure e=>1537, 1921
Employee's failure to provide complete
answers to interrogatories and failure to
provide list of trial exhibits was not sufficient to warrant discovery sanctions. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 37(b), 28 U.S.C.A.;
U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2.
5. Lis Pendens <s=>15
Where employee did not allege existence of equitable lien in his complaint but

sought monetary damages only, employee
could not file lis pendens; lis pendens could
not be filed in cases seeking only money
judgment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 37(b),
28 U.S.C.A.; U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2.
6. Witnesses <s=>204(2)
Employer whose employee had access
to documents exchanged between employer
and attorney was not entitled to exclude
those documents on grounds of attorneyclient privilege in breach of contract action.
7. Witnesses <s=205
Communications with attorney which
employer had not intended to keep confidential from employee were not privileged
as to employee. 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B);
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 72(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
8. Witnesses ®=>184(1)
Existence of agency relationship does
not override general requirement of intent
of confidentiality; communication is not
privileged as to party if there is no intent
to keep communication confidential.
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-8(2).
David E. Leta, Stephen R. Cochell, Salt
Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff and counterdefendant.
Jesse C. Trentadue, Gerald H. Kinghorn,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for counter-claimant.
Jesse C. Trentadue, John D. O'ConneU,
Gregory L. Probst, Harriet E. Styler, Salt
Lake City, Utah, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
BENSON, District Judge.
On April 3, 1992, the court heard oral
argument on several pending matters: (1)
plaintiff James H. Busch's Motion to Dismiss Counts 4, 7, and 8 Without Prejudice;
(2) defendant James Doyle's Motion for
Voluntary Dismissal of Counterclaim; (3)
plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment; (4) defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (5) plaintiff's
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; (6)
plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment;
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(7) defendant's Motion for an Order to Release Lis Pendens; and (8) defendant's Objections to Magistrate Order Denying Motion in Limine. Stephen R. Cochell represented the plaintiff, James H. Busch.
Gregory L. Probst, Gerald H. Kinghorn,
and John D. O'Connell represented the defendant, James Doyle.
Having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties, having heard oral
argument from counsel, being fully apprised, and for good cause appearing, the
court makes the following findings and enters the following MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER:
Background
This case involves a dispute over an oral
contract for employment. James Doyle
("defendant") was involved in a joint venture with RWR Investments, Inc., for the
purpose of developing land adjacent to a
golf course in southern Utah. He contacted James Busch ("plaintiff), the marketing director of a golf club in Florida, and
sought his help in the development of the
land. The parties allegedly entered into an
oral employment contract. In February,
1989, plaintiff moved to Utah and began
his employment.
Over the next several months, defendant
made several cash payments to plaintiff.
In May, 1989, defendant borrowed $30,000
from plaintiff. He later executed a promissory note in that amount. In 1990, a disagreement arose as to the amount of money owed to plaintiff as compensation for his
services.
In July, 1990, plaintiff joined with other
creditors in filing an involuntary petition of
bankruptcy against defendant. In re
James Doyle, Bankruptcy No. 90-04082.
Defendant opposed the petition, arguing
that it had been filed in bad faith. The
petition was dismissed pursuant to a Stipulation for Dismissal, dated July 27, 1990.
Soon thereafter, plaintiff initiated the
present litigation. Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached a contract to pay monthly
compensation as well as five percent of the
gross profits received from the sale or exchange of the land. The Complaint seeks

an accounting and the imposition of a con.
structive trust. The Complaint also seeks
recovery for breach of the promissory not*
Defendant responded to the Complaint by
filing a Counterclaim against plaintiff. .»
Pursuant to this dispute, several motions
are now pending before the court:
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Counts 4,
7, and 8
Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss
counts 4, 7, and 8 of the Complaint without
prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant
has filed no opposition to this motion. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion
to Dismiss is GRANTED. Counts 4, 7, and
8 of the Complaint are dismissed without
prejudice.
2, Defendant's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Counterclaim
[1] Defendant seeks to voluntarily dismiss his Counterclaim, pursuant to Rule
41(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that defendant's motion to dismiss is an
attempt to avoid sanctions under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff argues that the Counterclaim is
prohibited by the settlement stipulation
signed by the parties in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Pursuant to the stipulation,
defendant agreed that he would "not seek
nor make any claim against [plaintiff] in
connection with the filing of the Involuntary Petition." Plaintiff asserts that the
allegations in the Counterclaim are identical to the claims prohibited by the bankruptcy stipulation. Accordingly, plaintiff
asks the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions
against defendant.
The court finds, however, that Rule 11
sanctions are not appropriate in this case.
The scope of the bankruptcy settlement
agreement and the extent to which it prohibits subsequent claims is an unsettled
matter. Furthermore, many of the allegations in the Counterclaim are unrelated to
the settlement agreement. It has not been
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demonstrated that the Counterclaim was
filed in bad faith or in violation of Rule 11.
Thus, defendant's motion to voluntarily dismiss the counterclaim was not an attempt
to avoid Rule 11 sanctions. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule
41(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant's Motion for Voluntary
Dismissal of Counterclaim is GRANTED.
Defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs request for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED.
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment
As stated above, defendant's Counterclaim has been dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
on those claims is therefore moot. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on the
Counterclaim is dismissed.
4. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
[2] Defendant seeks summary judgment on plaintiffs first cause of action—
breach of contract on the promissory note.
Under the note, defendant was obligated to
pay $30,000 plus interest to plaintiff. It is
undisputed that plaintiff has received payments from the defendant well in excess of
$30,000. Thus, defendant argues that he
has not breached his obligations under the
promissory note and is entitled to a grant
of summary judgment on that claim.
Plaintiff argues, however, that the payments made by defendant were intended to
pay off other obligations. He asserts that
the money he has received from the defendant represents only partial repayment of
the note.
The court finds that there exists a genuine issue as to material facts on this issue.
The question whether the payments received by plaintiff represent a total or partial repayment of the promissory note is an

issue which must be resolved by the trier
of fact at trial. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
first cause of action is DENIED.
5. Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment
[3] When the promissory note came
due, defendant failed to tender payment
directly to plaintiff. Instead, he deposited
the money with the registry of the Clerk of
Court, pursuant to litigation between defendant and RWR Investments, Inc. RWR
Investments, Inc. v. James Doyle, Civil
No. 89-C-816S. Plaintiff argues that it
was improper to deposit the payment with
the court because the promissory note was
not related to the RWR litigation. It is
argued that because defendant failed to
tender payment directly, plaintiff was required to obtain counsel to collect on the
note, which resulted in unnecessary expense and delay.
The promissory note contains the following clause:
The obligor further agrees that if this
note shall be placed in the hands of an
attorney for collection, he will pay reasonable attorney's fees as well as legal
costs and disbursements.
Plaintiff argues that under this provision
he is entitled to recover the attorney's fees
and expenses incurred in obtaining the
money from the clerk of court.
Defendant argues that depositing the
funds with the court was sufficient to
make the funds available to plaintiff. He
asserts that plaintiff could have obtained
payment from the court without incurring
attorney's fees. Plaintiff himself, it is argued, is responsible for the delay in disbursement of the funds.
The court finds that there exists a genuine issue as to material facts on this subject. Whether it was necessary for plaintiff to place the note in the hands of an
attorney for collection, the reasonableness
of the attorney's fee, and the possible failure of plaintiff to mitigate damages are all
material issues of fact which must be decided at trial. Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
6. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment
[4] Plaintiff alleges that defendant
should be sanctioned for failure to comply
with court-ordered discovery. Specifically,
it is alleged that defendant failed to provide complete answers to interrogatories
and failed to provide a list of trial exhibits.
Plaintiff moves the court to impose default
judgment or some lesser sanction upon defendant pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court, however, finds that the conduct of defendant is not sufficient to warrant discovery sanctions. Because of the
dismissal of defendant's counterclaim,
much of the disputed discovery is no longer
relevant. Furthermore, the court finds
that plaintiff has suffered no prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion
for Default Judgment is DENIED.
7. Defendant's Motion for an Order to
Release Lis Pendens
[5] Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 (1992)
allows for the filing of lis pendens "[i]n any
action affecting the title to, or the right of
possession of, real property." Pursuant to
this statute, plaintiff filed a notice of lis
pendens on a parcel of land owned by defendant.
Defendant has filed a motion to release
the lis pendens, arguing that the present
litigation affects neither the title to nor the
right of possession of real property. He
asserts that a suit for monetary damages
does not allow for a filing of lis pendens.
Plaintiff argues that the litigation is sufficient to allow for a lis pendens filing
under the statute. The Complaint alleges
that plaintiff is entitled to five percent of
the gross profits realized from the sale or
exchange of the land. It seeks an accounting and the imposition of a constructive
trust on those profits. Plaintiff maintains
that because he claims a share of the proceeds from the sale of the property, his suit

affects the rights of possession and title
Furthermore, he argues that defendants
actions give rise to an equitable lien upoe
the property.
^ T h e court, however, finds that the filing
lof lis pendens was improper in this caa£
J Plaintiff did not allege the existence of a&
equitable lien in his Complaint. The Cojfl.
plaint seeks monetary damages only. Utaln
law does not allow for the filing of Kg
pendens in cases seeking a money judg,
ment. See Hamilton v. Smith, 808 F.2d 36
ilOth Cir.1986). A claim for a share of the
proceeds from the sale of land, when and tf
the land is sold, does not affect the title to
nor right of possession of the land. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion for an Order to Release Lis Pendens jg
GRANTED.
8. Defendant's Objections to Magistrate
Judge's Order Denying Motion in limine
Defendant seeks to exclude from evidence various communications made between defendant and his attorney. Pursuant to defendant's litigation with a thirci
party, defendant exchanged various doe»
uments with his attorney. Plaintiff, as an
agent of defendant working in defendant's
offices, had access to these documents. He
now seeks to use this information as evidence in the present litigation.
Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to
exclude the evidence, arguing that the information is protected under the attorneyclient privilege. The motion was referred
to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). The matter was fully
briefed and argued before the magistrate
judge. The magistrate judge held that a
party invoking the attorney-client privilege
must establish as a threshold requirement
an intent to keep the information confidential. He found that defendant and his attorney did not intend to keep the information confidential from plaintiff. Accordingly, the Motion in Limine was denied.
[6] Defendant made a timely filing of
Objections to the magistrate judge's Order,
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pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules
Civil Procedure. Under this rule, the
district court shall consider objections and
s et aside any portion of the order which is
found to be "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law."
Defendant first argues that the magistrate judge improperly applied the common
interest rule of Evans v. Evans, 8 Utah 2d
26, 327 P.2d 260 (1958). He asserts that
Evans applies only to those cases where
there has been previous joint representation by a single attorney. In the present
case, no attorney-client relationship existed
between plaintiff and defendant's attorney.
Thus, it is argued, the magistrate judge
incorrectly applied Evans to the facts of
this case.
0f

[7] The court, however, disagrees with
defendant's arguments. Defendant has
misinterpreted the magistrate judge's ruling. The magistrate judge did not hold
that Evans is controlling in the present
case. He merely stated that the reasoning
of Evans is applicable. There, the court
found that where communications were not
intended to be confidential, the attorneyclient privilege could not be invoked to
exclude those communications. Quoting
from Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252,
159 P.2d 142, 147 (1945), the Evans court
stated:
The mere fact that the relationship of
attorney and client exists between two
individuals does not ipso facto make all
communications between them confidential. As noted in Wigmore on Evidence,
"the circumstances are to indicate whether by implication the communication was
of a sort intended to be confidential."
Evans, 327 P.2d at 261. Thus, courts must
look at the circumstances to determine
whether there was an intent to keep the
attorney-client communications confidential. No privilege exists without an intent
of confidentiality.
In Evans, the court found that where the
parties were jointly represented by counsel,
there was no intent to keep the communications confidential. Similarly, the magistrate found that under the circumstances

of the present case, there was no intent to
keep the communications confidential from
plaintiff.
Defendant next argues that there is an
exception to the requirement of intent
when an agency relationship exists. He
asserts that an employer may invoke the
privilege against his agent, even if there
was no intent to keep the communication
confidential from the agent. The attorneyclient privilege, it is argued, universally
prevents former employees from using attorney-client communications as evidence
against their employer.
Defendant cites to Blankenskip v.
Rowntree, 219 F.2d 597 (10th Cir.1955) to
support this proposition. There, a memorandum was given to an employee to be
sent to the employer's attorney. The employee sought to use the memorandum as
evidence in subsequent litigation between
the employer and employee. The court refused to allow the evidence, finding that it
was a confidential communication subject
to the attorney-client privilege.
Although the facts of Blankenskip are
somewhat similar to the present case, there
is one significant difference between the
two cases. In the present case, the magistrate made a finding that neither defendant
nor his attorney intended the communications to be confidential as to the plaintiff.
In Blankenskip, no such finding was
made. In fact, the court found that the
memorandum was privileged as a "confidential" communication between the attorney and the employer. Blankenskip, 219
F.2d at 599.
Defendant himself stated that in Blankenskip, "[t]he court found that the document was intended to be a confidential
attorney-client privileged document—"
See Defendant's Memorandum in Support
of Objections to Order on Motion in Limine
by Magistrate Judge, at 6. This contrasts
with the present case where the magistrate
judge found just the opposite. Accordingly, Blankenskip does not support the proposition that intent of confidentiality is not
required when invoking the attorney-client
privilege against a former employee.
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Under Utah law, communications obtained by certain agents of the attorney are
privileged. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-248(2) (1992). However, the court is aware of
no statute extending this privilege to
agents of the client.
[8] The court finds that the existence of
an agency relationship does not override
the general requirement of intent of confidentiality. There is no universal privilege
against evidence obtained by former employees. Blankenship does not stand for
that proposition. The other cases cited by
defendant are not persuasive, and are not
binding in this jurisdiction.
Thus, it cannot be said that the magistrate judge's ruling was contrary to law.
When there has been no intent to keep a
communication confidential from a third
party, the communication is not privileged
as to that party. Denial of the Motion of
Limine, therefore, was proper. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's objections to the magistrate judge's Order denying motion in limine are overruled. The
Order of the magistrate judge is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED by the Court.

In re Grady W. McDANIEL & Margaret
McDaniel, Debtors.
Bankruptcy No. 91-02148.
United States Bankruptcy Court,
N.D. Florida.
April 7, 1992.
Chapter 7 trustee objected to debtor's
"Claim of Exempt Property." The Bankruptcy Court, Lewis M. Killian, Jr., J., held
that postpetition profit-sharing payments
from debtor's former accounting firm,
which were payable if debtor refrained

from competing, were part of the bankruptcy estate.
Objection sustained.
Bankruptcy <$=>2558
Monthly payments to debtor from his
former accounting firm under profit-sharing agreement triggered when debtor sold
his stock in the firm were not excluded
from debtor's estate as payments for postpetition services, even though debtor would
forfeit right to payments if he competed
with the firm; the covenant not to compete
was penalty separate from the main objective of the transaction, which was to sell
the debtor's stock in the firm, and earnings
for services not performed are not excluded from the estate under the exclusion for
earnings for postpetition services. Bankr.
Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(6).
Jerry W. Gerde, Panama City, Fla., for
debtor.
Ronald A. Mowrey, Tallahassee, Fla.,
Trustee.
ORDER ON TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION
TO CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
LEWIS M. KILLIAN, JR., Bankruptcy
Judge.
This matter came before the Court on
Ronald A. Mowrey, Trustee's objection to
Debtors' Grady W. and Margaret McDaniel, Claim of Exempt Property. The issue
before the Court is whether payments from
Debtor's former CPA firm are fresh start
wages under § 541(a)(6) and therefore excluded from Debtor's estate. Having considered the argument of counsel, the evidence presented, and for the reasons set
out below, we hold that the payments are
part of Debtor's estate and not within the
"services" exception of § 541(a)(6).
FACTS
Debtor was a shareholder in an accounting firm organized as a professional association. The firm's "employment agreement" specified that if any of the members
left the firm, the remaining members
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ing within a reasonable time, failing which
the grantor has a power of termination.
The majority cites in support thereof Salt
Lake City v. State, 101 Utah 543, 125 P.2d
790 (1942) and two cases cited and discussed
therein, Trustees of Union College v. City
of New York, 173 N.Y. 38, 65 N.E. 853
(1903) and Norton v. Valentine, 151 App.
Div. 392,195 N.Y.S. 1084 (1912). However,
in each of those cases there was contained
in the deed an express provision that if the
land were used for any purpose other than
that stated in the deed (Governor's residence, tabernacle and pastor's residence and
City Hall), the land would revert to the
grantor. In those cases the intent of the
grantor is clear and manifest. I have no
quarrel with the law which revests title in
the grantor when the property is not so
used within a reasonable time. However,
in the instant case all we have is the naked
statement that the property conveyed is to
be used as and for a church or residence
purposes only. This could be nothing more
than an attempt on the part of the grantor
to prevent the property from being used for
commercial or industrial purposes which
would interfere with her enjoyment in residing on her remaining property. It does
not appear to affirmatively require that a
church or residence ever be built.
No condition having been clearly expressed, and recognizing the fact that conditions controlling the use of deeded property are strictly construed against the grantor, and that forfeitures are not favored, I
am led to conclude that the judgment below
should be reversed.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of HOWE, J.
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John R. JENNER and Maijorie E.
Jenner, his wife, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
REAL ESTATE SERVICES, a Utah corporation; Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn
M. Franich, his wife; and Larry J. Nielson and Kay Nielson, his wife, Defendants and Respondents,
Ronald Johnson, Intervenor
and Appellant.
No. 18100.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 2, 1983.
Motions to intervene and to set aside
default judgment were denied by the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal
Taylor, J., and applicant for intervention
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J.,
held that partner having chosen to remain
undisclosed as partner and having permitted his partner to assume a role of sole
owner of their interest in property had no
standing after default judgment to assert
his interest, by way of intervention, as
against innocent third parties, though he
filed application for intervention within 11
days after learning of entry of judgment in
favor of plaintiffs.
Affirmed.
1. Parties <s=*42
Rule permitting intervention as matter
of right when applicant will be adversely
affected by court's disposition of property
requires that application be made timely,
and timeliness is to be determined under
facts and circumstances of each particular
case, in sound discretion of the court.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24(a).
2. Parties <s=>42
Courts are reluctant to make exceptions to general rule that intervention is not
to be permitted after entry of judgment,
and exception is made only upon strong
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showing of entitlement and justification, or
such unusual or compelling circumstances
as will justify failure to seek intervention
earlier. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 24(a).
3. Parties <s=>42
Partner having chosen to remain undisclosed as partner and having permitted his
partner to assume a role of sole owner of
their interest in property had no standing
after default judgment to assert his interest, by way of intervention, as against innocent third parties, though he filed application for intervention within 11 days after
learning of entry of judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24(a).
4. Partnership <s=»125
Notice to partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs operates as notice
to or knowledge of the partnership. U.C.A.
1953, 48-1-9.
G. Lee Rudd, Salt Lake City, for intervenor and appellant.
Allen M. Swan, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Ronald Johnson appeals from the denial
of his motions to intervene and to set aside
the default judgment entered against defendants.
Plaintiffs sold certain real property to
defendant Real Estate Services on a contract dated October, 1978. Thereafter, on
March 30, 1979, Real Estate Services assigned its rights and obligations under the
contract to defendants Franich and Nielson.
Just prior thereto, on March 27, 1979, defendant Joseph C. Franich entered into an
agreement with Johnson whereby Johnson
deposited $11,000 with Franich, who was to
use the money for real estate investments.
Franich was to receive a commission for
managing the investments and he and
Johnson would share equally the income
and profits after the return of Johnson's
capital investment. The subject property is
that in which Franich invested Johnson's
1.

State v. Chavez, N M.f 45 N M 161, 113 P 2d

money. Johnson's interest in the property
was undisclosed to plaintiffs, and it was not
made of record.
Defendants failed to make the payments
due under the contract. Plaintiffs elected
to declare a forfeiture, and in August, 1981,
sent each defendant a notice to pay the
delinquent payments within five days or
forfeit their interest in the property.
Defendants did not respond to the notice
and on August 19, 1981, plaintiffs initiated
this lawsuit, seeking inter alia, forfeiture
and cancellation of the contract and served
a summons on each of the defendants.
On September 15, 1981, Franich advised
Johnson that he was leaving town and desired to terminate their investment agreement. He offered his interest in the subject property to Johnson for $10,000. Johnson paid Franich $5,000 and gave him a
promissory note for the balance in return
for a quit-claim deed to the property.
On September 23, 1981, plaintiffs obtained a default judgment which forfeited the
interest of all named defendants and cancelled the contract. Johnson learned of the
judgment on September 25, 1981, and immediately contacted plaintiffs and offered
to bring the contract current, but plaintiffs
refused. Johnson filed his motions to intervene and to set aside the judgment on
October 6, 1981, and the district court denied both motions. At the hearing, Johnson
tendered the sum of $6,500 to bring the
contract current, including attorney fees.
It was declined.
The issue presented by this appeal is
whether the motion to intervene was timely, having come after the entry of judgment.
[1] Rule 24(a), Utah R.Civ.P., permits
intervention as a matter of right when the
applicant will be adversely affected by the
court's disposition of property. However,
the right is not absolute. The Rule requires
that the application for intervention be
made timely.1 Use of the word "timely" in
the Rule requires that the timeliness of the
179 (1941).
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application be determined under the facts
and circumstances of each particular case,
and in the sound discretion of the court.
[2] Generally, the cases hold that intervention is not to be permitted after entry of
judgment.2 The courts are reluctant to
make exceptions to the general rule 3 and
do so only upon a strong showing of entitlement and justification,4 or such unusual or
compelling circumstances5 as will justify
the failure to seek intervention earlier.
Postjudgment intervention is looked upon
with disfavor by reason of the tendency
thereof to prejudice the rights of existing
parties and the undue interference it has
upon the orderly processes of the court.6
In Rains v. Lewis,1 the Washington court
reaffirmed its holding in a prior case 8 and
stated the rule as follows:
[I]f [intervention is] permitted after
judgment, it should be only on a strong
showing after taking into consideration
all circumstances, including prior notice
of the lawsuit and circumstances contributing to the delay in making the motion.
To this we would add a showing of substantial prejudice if permission to intervene is denied.
[3,4] In the instant case, Johnson contends that he had no notice that the contract payments were in arrears, nor that
suit had been initiated against Franich and
the other defendants. He further contends
that his motion for intervention was timely
filed since he filed it within eleven days
after learning of the entry of judgment in
favor of plaintiffs. However, Johnson and
Franich were partners or co-venturers.
Such being the case, Johnson, having chosen
to remain undisclosed as a partner and hav2.
3.
4.

See 37 A.L.R.2d 1306.
McClain v. Wagner Electric Corp., 550 F.2d
1115 (CA.Mo. 1977).
U.S. v. Association Milk Producers, Inc., 534
F.2d 113 (CA.Mo. 1976).

5. Com. of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 66 F.R.D. 598
(D.C.Pa.1975), affd, 530 F.2d 501 (1977).
6. U.S. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232 (C.A.
Ala. 1977).

ing permitted Franich to assume the role of
sole owner of their interest in the property,
has no standing now to assert his interest as
against innocent third parties.9 Furthermore, notice to a partner of any matter
relating to partnership affairs operates as
notice to or knowledge of the partnership.10
Applying the foregoing rules of law to
the facts of this case, the trial court did not
err in denying Johnson's motion to intervene. Johnson was charged with notice of
the default in the contract payments by
virtue of the notice and demand for payment that was duly served upon Franich.
He was also charged with notice that plaintiffs sought cancellation of the contract,
restoration of possession and forfeiture by
virtue of the summons which was also duly
served upon Franich.
In light of the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson's motion for intervention on the
grounds that it was untimely. Having so
ruled, Johnson's further contention that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to
set aside the default judgment is rendered
moot.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiffs.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE, and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
7w\
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7. Wash.App., 20 Wash.App. 117, 579 P.2d 980
(1978).
8. Martin v. Pickering, 85 Wash.2d 241, 533
P.2d 380 (1975).
9. 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 176, citing In re
Flynn's Estate, 181 Wash. 284, 43 P.2d 8
(1935).
10. U.C.A., 1953, § 48-1-9; 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 175; 60 Am.Jur.2d Partnership § 135.
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Admittedly, damages for inconvenience,
annoyance, discomfort and mental distress
are not capable of precise calculation, although those elements may reflect direct,
immediate, and real injury. In this case the
jury had evidence before it to justify the
award of substantial damages of the type
under consideration. The Branches testified to the emotional distress caused Jeanne
Branch which culminated in her leaving her
husband for a period of three or four
months. In addition to that, the Branches
were forced to truck water onto their property and to take numerous other steps to
counter the nuisance created by Western.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court in all respects
except with respect to the striking of the
award of damages for mental distress, annoyance, and discomfort and remand for
the re-entry of that award in the amount
specified by the jury.
HALL, C.J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ.,
concur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein.
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Barbara LIMA, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Earl CHAMBERS, Defendant
and Respondent,
v.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervenor and Appellant.
No. 17622.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 26, 1982.
Automobile liability insurance carrier
providing uninsured motorist coverage

sought to intervene as of right as party
defendant in tort action between its insured
and uninsured motorist tort-feasor. The
Second District Court, Weber County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., denied intervention, and
carrier appealed. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that carrier could intervene.
Reversed.

1. Parties <s=>40(7)
Automobile liability insurance carrier
providing uninsured motorist coverage may
intervene as of right as party defendant in
tort action between its insured and an uninsured motorist tort-feasor. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 24; U.C.A.1953, 41-12-21.1.
2. Parties e=>41
In determining whether intervention as
of right is mandated, adequacy of representation generally turns on whether there is
identity or divergence of interest between
potential intervenor and original party and
on whether that interest is diligently represented. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 24, 24(a),
(a)(2).
3. Parties <@=>41
In determining whether intervention as
of right is mandated, representation is considered to be inadequate if original party is
not diligent in prosecution or defense of
action or allows default judgment to be
entered. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 24, 24(a),
(aX2).
4. Parties <s=»41
Rule governing intervention as of right
should be liberally construed to achieve purpose of eliminating unnecessary duplication
of litigation. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24.
5. Parties ®=*40(7)
Because applicable section requires insurers to assume financial responsibility for
judgments obtained by their insureds
against uninsured motorist tort-feasors and
because of insurer's contractual obligation
which embodies that statutory requirement,
insurer "is or may be bound" by tort judg-
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ment within meaning of rule providing for
intervention of parties as of right. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 24; U.C.A.1953, 41-12-21.1.
6. Parties <3=>48
When intervention is permitted, intervenor must accept pending action as he
finds it; his right to litigate is only as broad
as that of other parties to the action.
7. Trial <®=>127
Identity of intervening insurance company should be made known to jury in tort
action between insured and uninsured motorist tort-feasor, and intervening insurer
must disclose to its insured that their respective interests may be conflicting.
8. Witnesses <s=>196
Intervening insurer in tort action between insured and uninsured motorist tortfeasor must not be allowed to use against
its insured any information whatsoever
gained by reason of insurer-insured relationship.
9. Attorney and Client <s=>20
If intervening insurer in tort action
between insured and uninsured motorist
tort-feasor has obligation to defend insured,
for example as a defendant on counterclaim
by uninsured motorist, insured should be
allowed to choose his own independent
counsel who must then be compensated by
insurer. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24; U.C.A.
1953, 41-12-21.1.
Timothy R. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for
intervenor and appellant.
David Bert Havas, pro se.
STEWART, Justice:
[1] On this appeal we decide whether an
automobile liability insurance carrier providing uninsured motorist coverage may intervene as of right as a party defendant in
a tort action between its insured and an
uninsured motorist tortfeasor. The trial
court denied intervention; we reverse.
The facts are not in dispute. In July of
1977 plaintiff, Barbara Lima, was involved
in an automobile collision with defendant

Earl Chambers, an uninsured motorist.
Lima brought a negligence action against
Chambers, an answer was filed, and discovery ensued. Thereafter, Chambers' attorney withdrew from the case. The following day Chambers executed an affidavit
prepared by plaintiff's attorney acknowledging that he was uninsured and admitting that he had caused the collision with
plaintiff Lima. On the basis of that admission, plaintiff moved for and obtained a
summary judgment on the issue of defendant's liability, leaving the question of damages to be decided at trial. Thereafter,
plaintiff's liability insurer, Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Prudential), which is contractually liable for a
judgment against an uninsured motorist,
moved to intervene as a party defendant in
the litigation of the damages issue. Apparently considering our prior decision in Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 355, 502 P.2d 565
(1972), to be controlling, the trial court denied the motion to intervene.
Prudential appeals, urging that we overrule Kesler and allow intervention because
(1) it will be bound by a judgment against
the uninsured motorist and denial of intervention therefore violates its constitutional
right to due process; and (2) Rule 24, Utah
R.Civ.P., governing intervention, entitles it
to intervene as of right. Plaintiff Lima
counters that Kesler was decided correctly,
that Prudential has only a potential contractual obligation to plaintiff with no interest in the pending tort action, and therefore, that neither due process nor Rule 24
requires Prudential's intervention.
I.
Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 41-12-21.1 requires that automobile liability insurance
policies include coverage for accidents with
uninsured motorists:
[N]o automobile liability insurance policy
insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or
death or property damage suffered by
any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,
shall be delivered .. . unless coverage is
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for the proprovided in such policy
tection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting
therefrom. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, if an insured is injured by an uninsured motorist, the insured may recover
damages from his own insurance company
upon showing that he is "legally entitled"
to recover those damages from the uninsured tortfeasor. This showing of legal entitlement typically entails a lawsuit against
the uninsured tortfeasor to litigate the issues of liability and damages. A judgment
favorable to the insured fixes the insurer's
contractual duty to satisfy that judgment,
within the policy limits. The insurer is then
left to pursue its subrogation remedy
against the uninsured tortfeasor.
Because of the direct effect of the tort
litigation on the insurer's contractual duty,
both insureds and insurers have sought, under certain circumstances, to involve the
insurer in the tort litigation. Insureds have
pressed for intervention to make the tort
judgment binding on the insurer, and insurers have sought intervention to make certain the tort issues are fully and fairly
litigated. Three different attempts have
been made in this Court to involve an uninsured motorist insurance carrier in the tort
litigation between the insured and the uninsured tortfeasor.
The first attempt was in Christensen v.
Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447
(1971). There we held that to avoid the
disclosure of insurance coverage to the jury,
to prevent the mixture of a contract action
with a tort action, and to avoid placing the
insurer in a position hostile to its own insured, a plaintiff could not join its insurer
as a party defendant in the tort action
against the uninsured tortfeasor. The following year in Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d
355, 502 P.2d 565 (1972), we addressed the
precise issue raised again on this appeal:
Whether the insurer may, on its own motion, intervene as a party defendant in the

tort action between the insured and the
uninsured tortfeasor. There we concluded
that Christensen v. Peterson was controlling and, without discussing whether the
requirements of Rule 24 were satisfied, held
that the insurer could not intervene. Most
recently, in Wright v. Brown, Utah, 574
P.2d 1154 (1978), we held that the nonparty
insurer lacked standing to appeal the default judgment entered in favor of the insured against the uninsured tortfeasor.
Thus, one-by-one we have closed all three
doors to possible insurer participation in the
tort litigation and have thereby effectively
precluded the insurer from ensuring that its
contractual obligation is properly and fairly
invoked. As the law now stands, the insurer may not be joined, may not intervene,
and may not appeal. We are here asked to
open only the door of intervention.
II.
The overwhelming majority of courts
have allowed an uninsured motorist insurance carrier to intervene in a tort action
between its insured and an uninsured tortfeasor. See, e.g., Oliver v. Perry, 293 Ala.
424, 304 So.2d 583 (1974); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga.
App. 650, 152 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Wert v.
Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453, 197 N.E.2d 717
(1964); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 148 Ind.
App. 297, 265 N.E.2d 419 (1970); Rawlins v.
Stanley, 207 Kan. 564, 486 P.2d 840 (1971);
Barry v. Keith, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 876 (1971);
State v. Craig, Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343
(1963), Dominici v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806 (1964);
Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d
606 (1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh, 85
Nev. 310, 454 P.2d 106 (1969); Kirouac v.
Healey, 104 N.H. 157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962);
Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., Okl, 553 P.2d 153
(1976); Glover v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 306, 468 S.W.2d 727
(1971). See also 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile
Insurance § 331 (1980); Annot., 95 A.L.
R.2d 1330 (1964); Comment, Insurer Intervention in Uninsured Motorist Cases, 55
Ind.L.J. 717 (1980). The weight of these
authorities is sufficient to persuade us to
reevaluate our construction of Rule 24,
upon which the outcome of this case rests.
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Intervention of right is asserted m this
case under Rule 24(a)(2).1 By the terms of
that rule, an applicant must be allowed to
intervene if four requirements are met: 1)
the application is timely; 2) the applicant
has an interest in the subject matter of the
dispute; 3) that interest is or may be inadequately represented; and 4) the applicant is
or may be bound by a judgment in the
action. The timeliness of the application to
intervene in the hearing on damages in this
case has not been challenged and is deemed
satisfied. The remaining requirements are
discussed in order.

the uninsured tort-feasor, for liability and
damages, are the identical issues which
determine liability of Protective under
the insurance policy and which give rise
to Protective^ contractual duty to pay
the insured. Protective has a direct interest in the matter of litigation within
the meaning of our intervention statute.
169 N.W.2d at 611. Vernon Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Matney, 170 Ind.App. 45, 351
N.E.2d 60 (1976), identified the interest in
similar terms:
Clearly the basis of the action by Matney [insured] against Vernon [insurer] is
1. To justify intervention, the party
contractual. However, any action on the
contract is inseparably tied to the legal
seeking intervention must demonstrate a
liability of Thorns [uninsured tortfeasor].
direct interest in the subject matter of the
Therefore, the initial action in which the
litigation such that the intervenor's rights
liability of Thorns is determined is but the
may be affected, for good or for ill. In
first link in an unbroken chain leading to
State v. Craig, Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343
the contractual liability of Vernon.
(1963), the court stated:
[The required] interest does not include a Id. 351 N.E.2d at 64. See also Continental
mere, consequential, remote or conjectu- Ins. Co. v. Smith, 115 Ga.App. 667, 155
ral possibility of being in some manner S.E.2d 713, 715 (1967). In requiring the
affected by the result of the original ac- insurer to pay its insured what the insured
tion. It must be such a direct claim upon is "legally entitled" to recover from the
the subject matter of the action that the uninsured tortfeasor, within the limits of
intervenor will either gain or lose by di- the insured's policy, the legislature must
rect operation of the judgment to be ren- have intended that the insurer would "take
whatever legal steps were necessary and
dered.
to insure that the judgment
Id. at 346. See also State Farm Mutual fitting
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga.App. against the uninsured motorist
was
650, 152 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1966); Commercial rendered on legal and sufficient evidence."
Block Realty Co. v. United States Fidelity State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v.
& Guaranty Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081 Glover, 113 Ga.App. 815, 820, 149 S.E.2d
(1934).
852, 856 (1966).
We agree with the reasoning of the auThe court in State v. Craig, supra, held
that an insurer providing uninsured motor- thorities cited and conclude that since the
ist insurance has such a direct and immedi- extent of Prudential's contractual liability
ate interest because the insurer "should to its insured will be determined by the
have the right to dispute the questions amount of damages awarded to its insured
which make it liable on its contract." 364 in the tort action, Prudential stands to lose
S.W.2d at 347. Heisner v.'Jones, 184 Neb. by the operation of that judgment, and
602, 169 N W.2d 606 (1969), relied on that therefore has sufficient interest in that action to justify intervention.
same interest in allowing intervention:
It is apparent that the questions litigated
2. The next issue is whether Pruden[in] the action between the insured and tial's interest is or may be inadequately
1. Rule 24(a) Intervention of Right Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
(2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing

parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action.
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represented by the existing parties. Since
Prudential, if allowed, would intervene as a
party defendant, the question is narrowed
to whether the uninsured motorist, Chambers, would adequately represent Prudential's interest in actively litigating the issue
of damages. Prudential argues that its interest is inadequately represented because
Chambers lacks the assistance of counsel
and proposes to litigate the damages issue
pro se. Because of Chambers' ready admission of liability resulting in the summary
judgment establishing Chambers' liability,
Prudential has a reasonable basis for anticipating that the damages issue will not be
fully and fairly litigated without Chambers'
personal liability for the judgment provides
sufficient incentive to keep the damages
low. Lima also argues that the burden of
proof placed on him, coupled with the close
supervision of the trial court, will ensure a
just judgment.
[2] Adequacy of representation generally turns on whether there is an identity or
divergence of interest between the potential intervenor and an original party and on
whether that interest is diligently represented. Alsbach v. Bader, Mo.App., 616
S.W.2d 147,151 (1981); Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d
1412 (1962). Generally, where the applicant's interest is different from that of an
existing party, the applicant's interest is
not represented. While Prudential's interest appears on the surface to be the same as
Chambers', the interests are likely divergent. Chambers' primary interest appears
to be not in minimizing damages, but in
bringing the whole matter to a close as soon
as possible, with little regard for the
amount of damages awarded. In this case,
litigation of the damage issue by Chambers
on a pro se basis does not provide adequate
representation of Prudential's interest. Although Chambers will be personally liable
for the judgment and technically obligated
to reimburse Prudential, that does not suffice to assure adequate representation of
Prudential's interest.
[3] Closely related to the question of
similarity of interests is whether the interest of the applicant, even if assumed to be
Utah Rep 656-659
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represented, is represented diligently. Representation is considered to be inadequate if
the original party is not diligent in the
prosecution or defense of the action or allows a default judgment to be entered.
Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 at § 5 (1962).
The close cooperation between plaintiff and
defendant in resolving the liability issue in
this case evidences an absence of the adverse relationship essential to a full and fair
litigation of the damage issue. Moreover,
whereas a disinterested attitude of counsel
for an uninsured motorist may affect the
diligence of representation, an absence of
counsel for Chambers in the instant case
creates a strong presumption against adequate representation. Proper representation would undoubtedly be hampered further by Chambers' apparent inability to
read.
Finally, we reject plaintiff Lima's argument that a fair result is ensured by her
having to meet the burden of proof and by
court supervision. Neither position has
merit. The burden of proof requirement is
effective only when a case is actually and
fairly litigated m a truly adversarial trial.
As for court supervision, we need only remark that it is not the role of a judge to be
an advocate. Such a concept is fundamentally contrary to the nature of our adversary system. The court in State v. Craig,
Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343 (1963), responded
in like manner to the suggestion that the
interests of a defaulting defendant (and
hence the interests of the potential intervenor) were adequately protected by the
court:
We think the argument that relator's
interest will be "adequately represented"
in respect to Count I because the court
will require proof of plaintiff's cause is
specious. It is not the duty of the trial
court to subpoena and interrogate witnesses who might contradict the testimony of plaintiffs or those who might testify to compelling facts which show that
plaintiff is not "legally entitled to recover" the damages he claims. The court
cannot, and should not, act as attorney
for the defaulting defendants. Every
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practicing lawyer knows that, in so far as
the issues of fact are concerned, the defaulting defendants are not "adequately
represented."
Id. at 346.
We therefore conclude that Prudential's
interest is not adequately represented.
3. Finally, we must decide whether Prudential is or may be bound by a judgment
in the tort action. Prudential argues that it
is "probably bound" by a judgment against
the uninsured tortfeasor. Plaintiff Lima
argues that a judgment binds only the defendant Chambers, and not Prudential,
whose contractual obligation is merely triggered by the tort judgment.
[4] A major conflict of authority exists
on the meaning of the word "bound." Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 at § 6 (1962). Some
courts have applied a strict interpretation
requiring a showing that the judgment
would be res judicata as to petitioner for
intervention, thus preventing the retrial of
decided issues. Other courts have applied a
more liberal construction requiring only a
showing that the applicant would be bound
in a practical sense. The federal intervention rule and many states' rules have been
amended to clear up this ambiguity by deleting the "bound" requirement and requiring only that the judgment in some way
impair the applicant's interest. This construction is now applied in the majority of
jurisdictions, either under expressly reworded rules of intervention or through a liberal
construction of the term "is or may be
bound." We are of the opinion that Rule 24
should be liberally construed to achieve the
purpose of eliminating unnecessary duplication of litigation. Centurian Corp. v.
Cripps, Utah, 577 P.2d 955 (1978); Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, Utah, 548 P.2d 238
(1976). The language of the rule requiring
only that a petitioner show that he "may be
2. We need not decide whether Prudential might
be bound by the judgment under the doctrines
of res judicata or estoppel. That question cannot arise until it is established that there is a
right to intervene Presumably, a nonparty insurer could not be bound in a res judicata sense
unless it had the right and opportunity to intervene and chose not to. See Wells v. Hartford

bound," clearly contemplates that the rule
should be construed broadly enough to further both fairness and economy in judicial
administration.
[5] We hold that because section 41-1221.1 requires insurers to assume financial
responsibility for judgments obtained by
their insureds against uninsured motorist
tortfeasors (within certain limits), and because of the insurer's contractual obligation
which embodies that statutory requirement,
the insurer "is or may be bound" by the tort
judgment within the meaning of Rule 24.2
Having concluded that the four requirements for intervention of right have teen
met, we hold that Prudential should be allowed to intervene in the pending damages
litigation between its insured and the uninsured tortfeasor. Having resolved the issue
at hand on statutory grounds, we need not
address Prudential's constitutional argument concerning denial of due process.
In allowing intervention in this case, we
necessarily overrule Kesler v. Tate, supra,
and thereby partially fulfill Chief Justice
Hall's foreshadowing comment in Wright v.
Brown, supra at 1155, that "the time [could
be] nigh to alter the course of the law as set
forth in Christensen v. Peterson and Kesler
v. Tate."
III.
We do not hold that in each and every
uninsured motorist case intervention must
be allowed. In each case it will be necessary for the trial judge to make an assessment of the adequacy of representation. If
the defendant has counsel who actively litigates the case, intervention may not be
appropriate.
[6-9] When intervention is permitted,
the intervenor must accept the pending acAccident and Indemnity Co, Mo., 459 S.W.2d
253 (1970), Alsbach v Bader, Mo.App., 616
SW.2d 147 (1981), Donunici v. State Farm
Mut. Ins Co, 143 Mont 406, 390 P2d 806
(1964), Allstate Ins Co. v Pietrosh, 85 Nev.
310, 454 P.2d 106 (1969); Indiana Ins Co v.
Noble, 148 Ind App 297, 265 N.E 2d 419 (1970).
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tion as he finds it; his right to litigate is
only as broad as that of the other parties to
the action. E.g., Beard v. Jackson, Mo.
App., 502 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1973). The identity of the intervening insurance company
should be made known to the jury, and an
intervening insurer must disclose to its insured that their respective interests may be
conflicting.3 The insurer must not be allowed to use against its insured any information whatsoever gained by reason of the
insurer-insured relationship. See Barry v.
Keith, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 876 (1971). Finally,
if the insurer has an obligation to defend
the insured, for example as a defendant on
a counterclaim by the uninsured motorist,
the insured should be allowed to choose his
own independent counsel who must then be
compensated by the insurer.
The order of the trial court denying intervention is reversed and the case remanded
for further proceedings. No costs.
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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In the Matter of the Mental Condition
of Lewis Lee GILES.
No. 17976.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 29, 1982.
Mental patient appealed from ruling of
the Fourth District Court, Utah County,
David Sam, J., ordering his involuntary hospitalization. The Supreme Court, Howe, J.,
held that: (1) the action was not mooted by
3. We recognize that some conflict of interests
appears to be inevitable However, the interest
of fairness and judicial economy outweigh, in
our view, the potential difficulties arising from
a conflict of interest See, e g., Oliver v Perry,
293 Ala 424, 304 So 2d 583 (1974). Vernon

defendant's release from the hospital, and
(2) necessary elements for involuntary hospitalization existed at time of patient's commitment hearing.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.
1. Action <s=»6
Doctrine of collateral legal consequences, which is chiefly applied in criminal
cases where absence or presence of those
consequences may determine a criminal's
chance of rehabilitation or recidivism, is
equally applicable to patients of mental hospitals who face similar deprivations of liberty and whose commitment and hospitalization must stand scrutiny on the merits
when challenged.
2. Action <s=»6
In light of collateral consequences that
may have been imposed upon former mental patient were he to have faced future
confrontations with legal system, action
challenging his involuntary civil commitment was not mooted by his release from
hospital.
3. Mental Health <s=>439
In mental patient's action challenging
his involuntary hospitalization, there was
evidence from which trial court could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, at
time of his hearing, patient suffered from a
mental illness as defined by statute, posed
an immediate danger of physical injury to
others or himself, and lacked ability to engage in a rational decision-making process
regarding acceptance of mental treatment,
that no less restrictive alternative existed
to a court order of hospitalization, and that
hospital could provide patient with treatment that was adequate and appropriate to
his conditions and needs. U.C.A.1953,
64-7-28(1), 64-7-36(10).
Fire and Casualty Ins Co v Matney, 170 Ind
App 45, 351 NE2d 60, 65 (1976), Alsbach v
Bader, Mo.App, 616 SW2d 147, 153-54
(1981), Heisner v Jones, 184 Neb 602, 169
NW 2d 606, 612 (1969)
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Kenton L. STANGER; Dale M. Anderson,
as the personal representative of the
Estate of Merlin D. Anderson; and Balanced Security Corporation of America,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
SENTINEL SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 17757.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 11, 1983.
Insurance salesmen brought action
against employer to recover commissions.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Homer F. Wilkinson, J., entered judgment
for salesmen, and employer appealed. The
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1)
parol evidence was admissible to determine
parties' intentions regarding repayments of
promissory note and advances which were
used for operational expenses of salesman;
(2) evidence was sufficient to support finding that advances were not intended to be
repaid, or were not intended to be repaid
from commissions; and (3) error in calculating total amount due was "clerical mistake"
which could be corrected by trial court.
Affirmed and remanded.
1. Appeal and Error <s=> 1001(1)
In reviewing special verdicts, Supreme
Court will review evidence in light most
favorable to findings of jury and uphold
them, so long as there is competent evidence to sustain them.
2. Evidence <s=>397(2)
To preserve sanctity of written instruments, intent of parties to written integrated contract should be found within four
corners of that instrument.
3. Evidence <s=»398
Sales commission contract which was
silent on matter of lump-sum payments to
insurance salesman was not an integration

with respect to $7,000 lump-sum payment,
which salesman sought and used to further
sales production, and thus, in action to recover commissions, admission of salesman's
testimony regarding employer's promises
did not violate parol evidence rule.
4. Evidence <s=»445(6)
In action for commissions, insurance
salesman's testimony that he had not anticipated that he would be required to repay
advanced $7,000, which he used to further
sales production, was not an attempt, in
violation of the parol evidence rule, to alter
or vary terms of promissory note evidencing
indebtedness, as testimony showed only
that parties by subsequent oral agreement
agreed that note could be discharged in
some way other than payment in money.
5. Insurance <s=>84(6)
In action for commissions, testimony of
insurance salesman that parties by subsequent oral agreement agreed that promissory note could be discharged by producing
sales in substantial amount which was satisfactory to employer, and salesman's uncontradicted testimony that his sales production was fully satisfactory to employer, was
competent evidence from which jury could
have concluded that salesman had fully discharged note.
6. Evidence <s=>442(4)
In action for insurance commissions,
parol testimony was admissible as to parties' oral agreement that $23,403.95 paid to
salesman during his second contract year to
assist covering expenses of his agency was
not repayable, as employment contract was
silent on subject.
7. Insurance <s=>84(6)
In action to recover insurance sales
commissions, salesman's testimony that the
$23,403.95 employer advanced to him to assist in covering expenses of his agency for
second year of its operation was not to be
repaid, because employer had agreed to furnish funds to stimulate sales production,
was competent evidence upon which jury
could have based their finding of no liability of salesman for repayment.
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8. Evidence <s=>417(10)
In action for insurance sales commissions, parol evidence was admissible on issue whether $1,000 per month that special
agent received for 17 months he was employed by salesman was agreed to be repayable by special agent, and thus, was an
"indebtedness" for which salesman would
be liable, as agent's contract was silent regarding payments.
9. Insurance <s=>84(6)
In salesmen's action to recover insurance commissions, evidence that president
and vice-president of employer stated, before first of 17 $1,000 payments was made
to salesman's special agent, that payment
was not repayable, because it was intended
to assist agent in changing employers and
to further development of insurer's business, was competent to support jury's finding that amounts were not agreed to be
repayable; moreover, testimony that special
agent was not salesman's subagent at time
payments were made established that debiting salesman's account would be improper
under salesman's contract.
10. Insurance <s=>84(2)
As employer admitted that repayment
of advanced $13,628.85 was to be made only
on premiums paid on sales of insurance
under prior contract, employer's withholding of that amount from salesman's commissions was improper.
11. Judgment <s=>314
Award of damages, which was based
upon erroneous total shown in letter exhibit, could be recomputed by court as "clerical
mistake" under rule permitting trial court
to correct clerical mistakes in judgments at
any time. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
John P. Ashton and James A. Boevers,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.

HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiffs sued to recover commissions allegedly due them on sales of insurance
which they claimed were being wrongfully
withheld by defendant Sentinel. A jury
returned special verdicts finding that plaintiffs were entitled to their commissions,
that defendant had no contractual right to
repayment by plaintiffs of certain amounts
it had "advanced" them and that defendant
had waived and was estopped from requiring repayment. Defendant moved for
judgment NOV or for a new trial. The
motion was denied and defendant appeals.
On February 15, 1965 plaintiff Merlin D.
Anderson, together with two other partners, entered into a "Sales Management
Group Agreement" (SMG Contract) with
Sentinel. Sentinel had theretofore been
selling mostly small "burial plan" policies,
but planned an expansion into the sale of
large ordinary life insurance policies. Anderson and plaintiff Kenton L. Stanger had
previously been successful managers and
agents affiliated with Farm Bureau—Country Mutual Life Insurance Co. Stanger
signed a separate "General Agent's Contract" (Stanger Contract) with Sentinel on
March 1, 1965. Both contracts covered the
agents' authority, their territory, and the
payment of commissions. Only the SMG
Contract contained a provision on the payment of expenses of the Sales Management
Group which read as follows:
The Company may from time to time
pay expenses of the Sales Management
Group or sub-agents and if such expenses
are paid, such practice shall not create a
right in Sales Management Group or subagent to require such payment and the
Company may make agreements from
time to time that said advancements may
be reimbursable or nonreimbursable and
if such arrangements are made they shall
not set a precedent.
On March 10, 1965, Stanger received
$7,000 from Sentinel and executed a promissory note in that amount, payable in
amounts of not less than $100.00 per month.
Stanger complained that he did not like the
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payment provision, but was told by Sentinel
that it needed the note to get the payment
passed by the Board. Stanger used the
entire amount to develop new insurance
business for Sentinel. When Sentinel began withholding monthly installments from
Stanger's accrued commissions, Stanger immediately complained because he had been
told that the note would not be a debit.
Sentinel informed him at that time that if
his production was substantial and to Sentinel's satisfaction, the note would not have
to be repaid. The withholding of installments from commissions ceased in the fall
of that year.
In April of 1965 Stanger signed up as
Sentinel's special agent Robert Ipsen, who
for the next 17 months received $1,000 per
month advances from Sentinel for the development of the Arizona territory. Under
the Stanger Contract, the general agent
was responsible for any indebtedness arising under contract of all sub-agents under
his authority. Sentinel initially withheld
$1,000 as a debit against earned monthly
commissions from Ipsen's account. When
Ipsen complained, on similar grounds as
Stanger, that these were not to be reimbursable expenses, the practice was discontinued as against him, but the $17,000 later
appeared as a debit item on Stanger's
account. Stanger testified, and Sentinel
admitted, that at the time these sums were
advanced to Ipsen, he was a special agent
under Stanger's regional supervision, but
not his sub-agent.
In 1966, additional cash flow was required by Stanger to pay expenses and continue the operation of his insurance agency.
Stanger negotiated monthly payments of
$2,000 with Sentinel through the second
year of his contract. These again started to
show up as debits on the commission statements. Upon complaint, Stanger was told
that this method was necessary to reflect
an accounting on the books and that Sentinel considered these sums developmental
allowances which had nothing to do with
regular advances against commissions. The
practice of withholding these amounts was
stopped immediately. No further amounts
669P2d—27

were withheld from Stanger's commissions
between late 1965 and 1975.
On January 13, 1969 the SMG Contract
was superseded by a Modification Agreement resulting from the transfer of Anderson's two partners to employee status with
Sentinel. In that agreement the actual
debit balance for the Sales Management
Group was established at $93,285.26. Sentinel and the Sales Management Group
agreed that there would be no further overwrites earned under the old SMG Contract
for business produced after January 1,1969,
and that only overwrites accruing in the
future from business produced prior to January 1, 1969 would be applied to liquidate
the debit balance on the SMG account.
On March 1, 1969 Stanger and Anderson
as co-agents and Sentinel entered into a
new General Agent's Contract and Addendum to General Agent's Contract (Anderson-Stanger Contract). The account created as a result of the Anderson-Stanger Contract was denominated "001," whereas
Stanger's previous account was "439," and
Anderson's under the SMG Contract was
"461." Sentinel conceded that under the
Modification Agreement the alleged debits
of Anderson could have been withheld only
from account "461." However, all sums
contested in this action were withheld from
Stanger and Anderson from the "001"
account. Sentinel bases its right to withhold on language contained in each of the
Stanger, SMG, and Anderson-Stanger Contracts as follows:
Any debt due from or charged payable
by, the General Agent to the Company,
by virtue of this contract or otherwise,
shall be a first lien on all commissions
and benefits accrued hereunder.
The jury returned special verdicts with
damages of $27,016.40 to Stanger and Anderson, or a total of $54,032.80. That
amount was intended to be the total of the
four items listed in defendants' Exhibit D73, a letter addressed by Sentinel's accountant to its counsel explaining the items Sentinel had withheld from Stanger's and Anderson's commissions. That letter reads:
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March 25, 1981
Dear Dwight:
Per your request, please find below my
anaylsis [sic] of the major differences between Mr. Stanger's accounting and mine.
$53,745.63
+ 106.00
$53,851.63

Credit balances claimed by Mr. Stanger
Net Debit Balances per Sentinel
Accounting Difference as of 2-28-81

1. $ 7,000.00
2.
23,403.95
3.
17,000.00
4.
13,628.85
$54,032.80

1. The $7,000.00 represents the note executed in 1965.
2. The $23,403.95 represents advances to
Mr. Stanger during his 2nd contract year of
February 1966 through January 1967.
3. $17,000.00 represents advances to Robert Ipsen as sub-agent of Mr, Stanger during period of June 1965 through February
1967.
4. $13,628.85 represents Merlin Anderson's
share of Debit created while partner of
Sentinel Sales Management Group.
As is shown these major items account for
all but $181.17 of the differences.
Fred G. Cheney
Accountant

cretion to advance expenses from time to
time, and to make them reimbursable or
non-reimbursable.
[1] In reviewing the special verdicts in
favor of the plaintiffs, we will review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
findings of the jury, Williams v. State Farm
Ins. Co., Utah, 656 P.2d 966 (1982) and
uphold them, so long as there is competent
evidence to sustain them. Time Commercial Financing Corp. v. Davis, Utah, 657
P.2d 234 (1982) and cases therein cited.
Sentinel contends that both Stanger and
Anderson were bound by their written
agreements as a matter of law, that the
agreements were integrations and were intended by the parties to embody all of their
agreements. Thus Sentinel assails the admission by the trial court of parol evidence
of the intentions of the contracting parties
with respect to the various items and
amounts Sentinel had withheld. We will
examine each of the four items against this
contention:

(1) The $7,000 promissory note. Stanger
testified that soon after he entered into the
Stanger Contract on March 1,1965 he found
that the $500 per month which Sentinel
agreed to pay him for one year (without
any obligation of repayment) to assist in
the payment of the expenses of setting up
As can be seen on the face of the letter, his agency and developing business was inthe sum total of items 1-4 through clerical adequate because his agency was larger
error omitted the contested promissory note than most. He met with E. LaVar Tate,
in the sum of $7,000.00, which, when includ- president of Sentinel, and requested addied, brings the amount of withholdings to tional monies. Tate responded that he
$61,032.80. The amounts set forth in that thought he could work something out.
letter and claimed as debits appeared as Shortly thereafter, Sentinel mailed Stanger
subsidies and investments in some of Senti- a check for $7,000, which was enclosed with
nel's corporate documents. The record also the promissory note which Stanger was reindicates that in 1969 the SentineJ Board of quested to execute and return. Stanger did
Directors was informed that expenses for- so, but shortly thereafter complained to
merly chargeable to individual agents' Tate that he had not anticipated that he
accounts were to be treated as company would be required to repay the money.
expenses. Sentinel did not adduce any evi- Tate replied that he needed the note to get
dence in support of its theory that the the payment approved by the Board of Dimonies were advanced under a reimbursa- rectors. Stanger used the funds to further
ble "bridge-plan" which tides new salesmen sales production such as secretarial help,
over until such time as commissions are office expenses and recruiting salesmen.
generated. None of the contracts contained When the $7,000 appeared as a debit on one
such a provision, and only the SMG Con- of Stanger's monthly commission statetract provides for Sentinel's unilateral dis- ments from Sentinel, he again protested to
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Tate. Tate reiterated that that was Sentinel's method of accounting but that if Stanger's production was substantial and Sentinel was satisfied with it, the note would not
have to be repaid.
[2,3] To preserve the sanctity of written instruments, the intent of the parties to
a written integrated contract should be
found within the four corners of that instrument. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner,
Utah, 636 P.2d 1060 (1981). The Stanger
Contract was silent on the matter of lump
sum payments to Stanger such as the
$7,000. The contract therefore was not an
integration with respect to the $7,000 since
it contained no provision that a lump sum
of money would be made available by Sentinel nor whether it would have to be repaid.
Therefore, the admission of Stanger's testimony regarding Tate's representations and
promises did not violate the parol evidence
rule as varying the terms of an integrated
contract.
The doctrine of partial integration is that
where a written contract is obviously not,
or is shown not to be, the complete contract, parol evidence not inconsistent with
the writing is admissible to show what
the entire contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished from contradicting, the writing. In such a case parol
evidence to prove the part not reduced to
writing is admissible, although it is not
admissible as to the part reduced to writing.
30 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 1043.
In a somewhat similar fact situation the
Supreme Court of Iowa in Forbes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 150 Iowa 177, 129 N.W.
810 (1911) held that where a written contract employing an attorney is silent on the
subject, parol evidence is admissible to show
who is chargeable with certain expenses in
conducting a suit. See also North American Uranium, Inc. v. Johnston, 77 Wyo. 332,
316 P.2d 325 (1957).
[4,5] Nor was there an attempt here to
alter or vary the terms of the note. The
testimony of Stanger only showed that the
parties by a subsequent oral agreement
agreed that the note could be discharged in

some way other than payment in money.
That way was by producing sales in a substantial amount which was satisfactory to
Sentinel. Stanger further testified that his
sales production was indeed good and fully
satisfactory to Sentinel. Sentinel did not
claim otherwise. Therefore, there was competent evidence from which the jury could
have concluded that Stanger had fully discharged the note.
[6,7] (2) The $28,403.95 paid to Stanger
during his second contract year. This
amount is the balance which Sentinel
claimed was owing from payments of $2,000
which were made to Stanger to assist covering expenses of his agency for the second
year of its operation. As with the promissory note, the Stanger Contract was silent
on the subject of this item and therefore
the contract cannot be considered an integration of the agreement of the parties
concerning whether it should be repaid or
not. Parol testimony was therefore admissible as to the parties' oral agreement that
this amount was not repayable. The evidence was conflicting with Stanger contending that they were not to be repaid
because Sentinel had agreed to furnish the
funds to stimulate sales production. This
was competent evidence upon which the
jury could have based their finding of no
liability.
[8,9] (3) Payments to Robert Ipsen of
$17,000. Sentinel claimed the right to withhold this amount from Stanger's commissions because in the second amendment to
the Stanger contract it was provided:
The general agent shall be responsible for
the indebtedness of all agents under his
authority which has arisen from said
agent's contracts and which have been
created while under his authority.
Sentinel urges that under this provision
Stanger was liable as a matter of law for
the repayment of th* $17,000. That argument, however, overlooks the fact that Ipsen's contract with Sentinel was silent regarding the $1,000 per month Ipsen received for the 17 months he was employed.
Here again, as was the case with Items 1
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and 2, the written contract was not an
integration as to this subject. Therefore,
whether the $17,000 was agreed to be repayable by Ipsen and thus an "indebtedness" for which Stanger would be liable
became a question of fact and parol evidence was admissible. While the evidence
was conflicting, Stanger adduced testimony
that the president and vice president of
Sentinel stated before the first payment
was made to Ipsen that it was not repayable because it was intended to assist him in
changing employers and to further the development of Sentinel's business in Arizona.
There being competent evidence to support
the jury's finding on this issue, we will not
disturb it. Moreover, there was also testimony that Ipsen was not Stanger's subagent at the time the payments were made
and therefore the debiting of Stanger's
account would be improper under the Stanger Contract.

initial four year period of his relationship
with Sentinel. The jury observed the witnesses, heard their testimony, and it was
their exclusive province to weigh the evidence in deciding in favor of one side or the
other.
We have reviewed Sentinel's contention
with respect to the jury instruction on Sentinel's first lien right on all commissions for
debts due and the issues of estoppel and
waiver. Inasmuch as the jury found, and
we have affirmed their finding, that Sentinel had no contractual right to sums withheld from commissions, that finding is dispositive of this appeal and we deem it unnecessary to address those issues.

[11] One point, however, remains to be
addressed. As noted above, the jury utilized Sentinel's calculation of amounts withheld from commissions to arrive at an
award of damages of $27,016.40 to each
[10] (4) $13,628.85, representing AnderAnderson and Stanger, based upon the total
son's share of debit created while operating
under the SMG Contract. At the trial the of $54,032.80 shown in the above letter expresident of Sentinel agreed with Stanger hibit. In fact, the correct total was $61,and Anderson that the repayment of this 032.80, which would make a total award of
amount was expressly covered by the Modi- $30,516.40 to each of the two plaintiffs.
fication Agreement of January 13, 1969, Under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
and that under the terms thereof only pre- Procedure, the trial court may correct clerimiums paid on sales of insurance under the cal mistakes in judgments at any time. See
SMG Contract prior to 1969 would be used also Bagnall v. Suburbia & Co., Utah, 579
to reduce and eventually eliminate Ander- P.2d 917 (1978). In explanation of the inson's debit balance. The $13,628.85 with- tent of the identical Federal Rule of Civil
held from the "001" account represented, Procedure, the comment has been made
according to the breakdown provided by that "in this broad approach to correctibiliSentinel, Anderson's share of debit created ty under Rule 60(a), it matters little whethwhile a partner under the SMG Contract. er an error was made by the court clerk, the
In view of this recognition by Sentinel, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge
trial court could have ruled as a matter of himself, so long as it is clearly a formal
law that Sentinel's withholding of this error that should be corrected in the interest of having judgment, order, or other part
amount was improper.
In sum, it was proper to admit parol of the record reflect what was done or
evidence extrinsic to the Stanger Contract intended." Annot., 13 A.L.R. Fed. 794
and the evidence so admitted clearly sup- (1972). The definition of "clerical mistake"
ports the factual findings of the jury that thus extends to include the one here discovSentinel had no contractual rights to with- ered. "It is a type of mistake or omission
hold any of the sums hereinabove referred mechanical in nature which is apparent on
to from Stanger for the reasons we have the record and which does not involve a
given. As to Anderson, Sentinel conceded legal decision or judgment by an attorney."
it was not permitted to charge the "001" In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 266
account for funds advanced him during the F.Supp. 605, 607 (1967). Our instruction to
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the district court to correct the incorrect
total amount of judgment, where the mistake is clear from the record, reflects no
more than what plaintiffs are entitled to
under the verdict. Accord Fay v. Harris, 64
Ariz. 10, 164 P.2d 860 (1945).
The judgment on the special verdicts is
affirmed in all respects. The case is remanded to the trial court for the limited
purpose of correcting the amount of damages to reflect an award of $30,516.40 to
each of the plaintiffs. Costs awarded to
plaintiffs.
HALL, CJ., STEWART and OAKS, J J ,
and DAVID SAM, District Judge, concur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein.
DAVID SAM, District Judge, sat.
rw

to recover, it was necessary to establish
that causal effect of defendant's conduct
outweighed combined effect of all other
causes, including conduct of plaintiff and
alienated spouse; (3) punitive damages
were recoverable as long as plaintiff
showed circumstances of aggravation in addition to malice implied by law from conduct of defendant in causing separation of
plaintiff and his spouse; and (4) an award
of punitive damages could not be entered,
however, without first adducing evidence or
making findings of fact with regard to defendant's net worth or income.
Reversed and remanded.
Hall, C.J., and Stewart, J., concurred in
part and dissented in part and filed separate opinions.
Durham, J., concurred in result and
dissented in part and filed opinion.
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Brett W. NELSON, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.

Jeff JACOBSEN, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 17667.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 31, 1983.
Action was instituted for alleged alienation of wife's affections. The Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, Don V. Tibbs,
J., entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court,
Oaks, J., held that: (1) notice of trial described nature of proceedings against unrepresented defendant in such ambiguous
terms that it deprived him of adequate time
to prepare for his defense in violation of his
right to due process; (2) an action for alienation of affections was still a viable cause
of action in Utah, but in order for plaintiff

1. Constitutional Law <s=>251.6
A party is deprived of due process
where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to
inform a party of nature of proceeding
against him or is not given sufficiently in
advance of proceeding to permit preparation. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
2. Constitutional Law <s=»251.6
To satisfy an essential requisite of procedural due process, a "hearing" must be
prefaced by timely notice which adequately
informs the parties of the specific issues
they must prepare to meet. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
3. Constitutional Law <s=>251.5
"Due process" is not a technical concept
that can be reduced to a formula with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and
circumstances, but is a concept which rests
upon basic fairness and demands a procedure that is appropriate to case and just to
parties involved. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
14.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
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int in Brewer,
t Innis "was
appeal to his
fety of handihere anything
iat the police
sually disorif his arrest."
S.Ct. at 1690.

incrimination under circumstances not
amounting to interrogation.11
CONCLUSION
Singer was properly convicted of manslaughter. The evidence presented was
sufficient to demonstrate that Singer acted
recklessly in firing the shot which killed
Lieutenant Fred House. Singer's statements to law enforcement officers were not
obtained through coercive interrogation or
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Singer's conviction is affirmed.

[8] Similar to Innis, the conversation
between the agents transporting Singer
was very brief, comprising only a few sentences of off-hand remarks. Singer claims
that because the bombing and siege resultBILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.
ed from difficulties experienced by his own
family, the agents' comments about "family" were purposefully intended to be the
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >
7 /-+*+*+*+* **
functional equivalent of interrogation. We
disagree. The agents' comments can most
fairly be construed in the context of two
fatigued officers who had been working
long shifts at all hours of the day and
night, while separated from spouses and
children. Even when generously viewed STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
from Singer's perspective, nothing in the
v.
record suggests that the agents' pining for
Joseph Finano MOYA, Defendant
their own homes and families represented
and Appellant.
anything other than what the trial court
Nos. 890608-CA, 900445-CA.
concluded it was—the natural expression of
familial sentiment.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Singer's decision to relate the story of
July 17, 1991.
the siege from his standpoint came within a
very few minutes of a full explanation and
recitation of his rights, accompanied by his
Defendant appealed from orders of the
signed waiver. His change of heart fol- Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
lowed a brief interpersonal exchange be- Scott Daniels, J., revoking probation and
tween the two agents—not a lengthy emo- revising wording of his original sentence.
tional discourse focused toward Singer. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that
The agents honored Singer's request to (1) defendant's 18-month probation period
remain silent and ceased questioning until was not tolled upon violation of probation,
Singer injected himself into the conversa- and (2) rule governing corrections of clerition and voluntarily related his tale. We cal errors could not be applied to revise
hold that no violation of Singer's right to wording of defendant's original sentence to
remain silent occurred, as Singer voluntar- stay imposition of probation after 18ily abandoned his privilege against self- month probationary period expired.
11. The State also urges us to follow the rule of
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 VS. 96, 96 S.Ct 321, 46
L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), where the Supreme Court
held that a second interrogation following two
hours after the initial invocation of Miranda
rights, and addressing a crime unrelated to that
for which defendant was arrested, did not vio-

late Miranda when a new set of warnings was
administered. Because we do not find Singer's
Miranda rights to have been violated we do not
reach this issue. However, we note that unlike
Mosley, Singer was given no second admonition
after he initiated conversation with the agents.
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Reversed and vacated.
«-r --I J Jj.• •
Bench, PJ., filed dissenting opinion.
1. Criminal Law <®=>982.7
Defendant's 18-month probation period was not tolled upon violation of probation where violation was not properly acted
upon in timely fashion. U.C.A.1953, 7718-l(10)(a)(1985).
2. Criminal Law <s=>996(2)
Rule governing corrections of clerical
errors could not be applied to revise wording of defendant's original sentence to stay
imposition of probation after 18-month probationary period expired. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 60(a).

James A. Valdez and Ronald S. Fujino
(argued), Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., and Judith
S.H. Atherton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued),
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Defendant Joseph F. Moya appeals from
an order revoking probation and reimposing a sentence of zero to five years in the
Utah State Prison. Defendant also appeals
from an order for correction of a clerical
error, granted pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P.
60(a), revising the wording of his original
sentence. We reverse the order revoking
1. Because defendant remains on parole from
the Utah State Prison, any further violation
might constitute grounds for an immediate return to prison. Defendant's position is that he
should never have been imprisoned so he could
be paroled, since his probation had expired long
before it was purportedly revoked.
Although the state suggested at oral argument
that defendant is presently a fugitive from New
Mexico and Utah justice systems, nothing in the
record before us substantiates this claim.

probation and vacate the order revising
defendant's sentence.
«^«^.
FACTS
The facts critical to resolution of this
appeal are unusually convoluted. The procedural history of the case is tangled with
defendant's turnstile entries and exits from
Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona, in whose
jails and prisons he has been a frequent
resident over the past several years. The
state concedes its position on appeal "has
problems" and would welcome a determination of mootness and dismissal of the appeal. However, the potential for further
mischief resulting from the sentence imposed upon defendant denies us that luxury.1
On August 10, 1984, defendant pled
guilty to a charge of burglary, a thirddegree felony. On September 13, 1984, he
was sentenced to a suspended prison term
of zero to five years, and an eighteenmonth probation was imposed. The eighteen-month period following imposition of
sentence expired on March 13, 1986. The
intent and effect of that probation order
poses the crucial question in this appeal.
Four days after the order was entered, the
court ordered defendant's extradition to
New Mexico to face pending criminal
charges. In October, defendant was escorted to New Mexico, where he remained
in custody for several months, until the
New Mexico charges were dismissed.
On January 9, 1985, while defendant was
still in custody in New Mexico, the Utah
Office of Adult Probation and Parole (AP
& P) filed an incident report with the court,
informing the court that defendant failed
to report to his probation officer. Unaware of defendant's excellent excuse for
not meeting with his probation officer in
Moreover, the state has not sought dismissal of
the appeal on this basis, as proposed in the
dissent. See Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474
(Utah 1981). The instant case is readily distinguishable from Hardy. Moya never escaped
custody in Utah. Whether or not defendant is
now absent from supervision is irrelevant, since
we hold that parole supervision over him terminated by operation of law long before his alleged fugitive status arose.
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Utah, i.e., that Utah authorities had escorted him to New Mexico where he remained
in custody, AP & P requested that a nobail, nationwide arrest warrant be issued
for defendant, which the court authorized.
On April 17, 1985, after learning of defendant's extradition to and custody in New
Mexico, AP & P requested that the nationwide warrant be withdrawn and a "domestic/' i.e., statewide, warrant be substituted.
A few weeks later, the court withdrew the
nationwide warrant and issued another
warrant, authorizing defendant's arrest
only if he was found in Utah.
Defendant was released from custody in
New Mexico and shortly thereafter, on August 8, 1985, perpetrated a forgery in New
Mexico. On September 23, 1986, he pled
guilty to forgery and was granted probation by the New Mexico court in lieu of
further incarceration. Defendant managed
to estrange himself from the courts for the
next two years, until AP & P learned of his
return to Utah. On October 21, 1988, over
four years after sentencing on the burglary
conviction, and two and one-half years after defendant's Utah probation term had
seemingly expired, AP & P filed its first
affidavit in support of an order to show
cause, seeking to revoke defendant's probation on the grounds defendant had failed to
execute a probation agreement, failed to
appear for probation, and failed to complete restitution payments.2 AP & P filed
an amended affidavit upon learning of defendant's forgery conviction in New Mexico. The amended affidavit also alleged
commission of a burglary in Utah during
the summer of 1988.
At a hearing on the order to show cause
to revoke defendant's probation, held on
November 10, 1988, the court stated it was
revoking defendant's probation for the rea2. Defendant claims that AP & P*s tardy filing
was improper under law which was clearly established at the time the action seeking probation revocation was commenced. State v.
Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988). Because
we reverse and vacate the order stemming from
that filing on other grounds, we do not reach
this claim.
3. Utah R.Civ.P. 81(e) provides that the Rules of
Civil Procedure "shall also govern in any aspect
of criminal proceedings when there is no other

sons stated in AP & P's amended affidavit,
and reimposed the original prison term.
Defendant was committed to the Utah
State Prison, where he remained until February 16, 1989, when he was extradited for
a second time to New Mexico. On February 3, 1990, defendant was granted parole
on the initial Utah burglary charge. Defendant's parole period remains in effect
through November of this year. Defendant's alleged violation of probation in New
Mexico, subsequent commission of a burglary in Utah, and his probationary status
in Utah remain unresolved.
Defendant continues to challenge the
revocation of his Utah probation, claiming
revocation was improper as the probation
period had long since terminated by its own
terms before probation was purportedly revoked. Meanwhile, on July 7, 1990, the
trial court granted the state's motion seeking an order under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(a)3 to
"correct a clerical error" in the original
sentence. Defendant's sentence thereafter
clearly stated that the commencement and
conditions of probation were to have been
stayed pending defendant's return from
New Mexico. Nonetheless, it is not altogether clear when, if ever, this revised
order would have started his Utah probationary period of eighteen months, although the state suggested at oral argument it would not begin until defendant
returned to Utah and signed a probation
agreement.
IMPOSITION AND TOLLING
OF PROBATION
[1] Defendant claims probation was
originally imposed at sentencing on September 13, 1984. Defendant points out
that unless it was imposed at that time, AP
applicable statute or rule." An order under
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(a) is the proper device for
correcting inaccuracies in the memorializing of
civil judgments. However, Utah R.Crim.P.
30(b), nearly textually identical to Utah R.Civ.P.
60(a), would have been the more appropriate
vehicle to employ in this case. Because we hold
the substantive sentencing order to be error,
review of an order based on either rule results
in the same conclusion.
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g, p*s concerns over his not reporting for
probation, its securing warrants as a result, and its ultimate efforts to have probation revoked would be quite anomalous.
Given AP & P's course of conduct, defendant suggests the state should not now be
heard to contend that probation was not
"really" imposed at the time of sentencing.
Defendant maintains that the court lost
probation jurisdiction eighteen months after initial imposition of his sentence by
operation of law.4
While conceding before this court that
probation was imposed, effective upon the
entry of sentence, the state counters that
probation was never executed, arguing
both that the court stayed probation and
that defendant failed to sign a probation
agreement.5 Although the trial court later
purported to dissolve the stay and impose
probation, the state argues before this
court that defendant remains subject to a
full eighteen-month term of probation on
the original burglary charge until he
presents himself before AP & P officials
and signs a probation agreement.6 Acknowledging the conceptual difficulty of a
parolee being placed on probation concerning the very charge which landed him in
prison, the state asks that the order revoking defendant's probation be reversed and
4. Relying on In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531
(1903), defendant also argues that the court lost
jurisdiction when it effectively suspended his
incarceration indefinitely by withdrawing the
nationwide arrest warrant and substituting a
domestic warrant. Defendant claims he was
free from incarceration as long as he remained
outside Utah, or while in Utah, avoided arrest.
Because we hold the court had no jurisdiction
upon expiration of the probation period stated
in the court's initial order, we do not reach this
5. The subtle distinction argued by the state revolves on whether probation was "stayed" at the
time of imposition. The state now claims that
the trial court imposed probation, but then immediately stayed the execution of probation and
argues that the stay was never lifted. We address this argument as it relates to the Rule
60(a) order, infra.
6. The defendant also argues that insofar as the
court relied on the tolling provision of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (Interim Supp.
1984), such reliance was error and tolling did
not apply. See State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464

the case remanded for execution of probation.
At the time defendant was sentenced,
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim
Supp. 1984) provided:
Upon completion without violation of 18
months probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or six months in
class B misdemeanor cases, the offender
shall be terminated from sentence and
the supervision of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier terminated by the court.
This same provision was recently construed by the Utah Supreme Court in State
v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988). The
Court stated that the Legislature holds the
power to fix the limits of sentencing and
probation. The statute establishes eighteen months as the normal maximum limit
for probation in a felony case. The trial
court's discretion to revoke probation may
only be exercised within that limitation and
upon following a particular procedure.7
See Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 790-91
(Utah 1990); Green, 757 P.2d at 464. See
also State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah
CtApp.), cert denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah
1989). In Green, the defendant committed
a violation prior to the expiration of his
probationary period. However, the action
to revoke Green's probation was not com(Utah 1988). Although the state relied primarily
on the tolling argument below, it has abandoned that position on appeal. Thus, the state
is not contending that the initial incident report
or the related domestic warrant tolled the expiration of the 18-month probationary period.
Its point is that the 18-month period had not
started to run when defendant was first sentenced. The state fails to explain how the incident report claiming a probation violation could
have been properly filed or the related warrant
properly issued if probation had not yet even
commenced.
7. That procedure includes filing and service of
an affidavit of probation violation prior to the
time the probationary period has expired. See
Green, 757 P.2d at 464; Utah Code Ann. § 7718-1(9) (1990). Probation may not be retroactively revoked no matter how clear it subsequently appears that probation requirements
were not followed, where no enforcement action is taken prior to the elapse of the term of
probation.
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menced until several months after the probationary period ended.
The Court held that the probationary period for a felony terminated by operation of
law eighteen months after imposition, absent commencement of an action to extend
or revoke probation filed within the probationary period.8 Rejecting the state's argument that probation was tolled by the mere
commission of a violation of probation
terms, the Court stated:
The statute requires that the offender
"shall" be terminated from sentence if
eighteen-months' probation is completed
without violation. This strong mandate
is not consistent with the State's position
that the eighteen-month term is "tolled"
when any violation occurs within the period
This construction would obviate the certainty and regularity created
by the statute and ignore the plain meaning of the word "terminate."
Green, 757 P.2d at 464. The statute under
which defendant's probation was imposed
simply does not contemplate tolling upon
violation of probation terms where the violation is not properly acted upon in timely
fashion.9 We therefore hold that, unless
the Rule 60(a) modification dictates another

result, the trial court's jurisdiction over
defendant terminated at the end of the
eighteen-month probation period. See
notes 6 & 8, supra,

RULE 60(A) CORRECTION
OF CLERICAL ERROR
[2] The state relies entirely on the trial
court's Rule 60(a) order correcting the terminology of defendant's probation sentence
to support its position that probation may
have been imposed, but was never executed.10 The state claims that probation
was ordered "nunc pro tunc" on July 3,
1990, the date of the court's announcement
of the Rule 60(a) order revising defendant's
sentence, which was signed on July 26,
1990. The state further asserts that probation has still not yet:6een actually imposed
because defendant has not yet returned to
Utah for execution of probation, despite
the fact that defendant has been incarcerated, granted parole, and released—all on
the ground he violated the probation which
was only very recently imposed "nunc pro
tunc." n
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) provides: "Clerical mistakes in judgments . . .

8. In Green, the Court reserved the question of
how far a probation revocation or modification
action must proceed before the expiration of the
18 month period. However, in Smith the Court
stated that a probationer who is not attempting
to evade probation officers must be served with
notice of the action within the probation period.
803 P.2d at 793. In this case, the incident report was filed within 18 months from defendant's original sentence; it was not served on
defendant. The order to show cause on which
the trial court ultimately acted was not even
issued until two and one half years after the 18
months had expired. It alleged probation violations other than the one alleged in the incident
report. Indeed, it alleged violations which occurred beyond the 18-month period.

to move the starting date of defendant's probation forward in time. Its dilemma lies in articulating a theory that would both validate defendant's incarceration in late 1988 for probation
violation and demonstrate that he is still subject
to a term of probation that has not yet been
executed.
10. The state's principal brief, while praiseworthy in its inclusion of pertinent citation to
and quotation from the record, devotes only
passing attention to defendant's primary arguments. The state relies almost exclusively on its
position that each of defendant's arguments is
moot when viewed with the benefit of the Rule
60(a) order revising defendant's original sentence.

9. In arguing that his probation expired eighteen
months after imposition, defendant also notes
that the state could have sought continuation of
his probation by merely filing appropriate motions and affidavits within the proper time. The
state has chosen not to respond to this and
related arguments, relying instead on the trial
court's subsequent revision of defendant's sentence. Ignoring AP & P*s prior conduct suggesting probation started upon entry of sentence,
i.e., its early incident report, the state endeavors

11. In light of this extraordinary circumstance
under the state's own view—a defendant reposing at the Utah State Prison for violation of
probation which was ordered long after his parole and has yet to be imposed, i.e., executed—
we believe that the state strains for a Latin gnat
Truly, the state's claim is not that the sentence
was imposed "nunc pro tunc;" rather, the state s
position reflects a "tunc pro nunc" reality. See
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 n. 1 (Utah
1981) (explaining "nunc pro tunc" in a similar
context).
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arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time
"
Neither defendant nor the state contests
that the substantive purpose of Rule 60(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
limited to curing errors in accurately memorializing a judgment
Substantive
modifications to address subsequent developments are not authorized under Rule
60(a). We review Rule 60(a) orders under
an abuse of discretion standard. See Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984).

of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for a period of 18
months, said conditions of probation to
be stayed until defendant is returned
from New Mexico.13

Defendant maintains that the Rule 60(a)
order was inappropriate because no "clerical" error existed in the court's original
judgment and sentence. See Richards v.
Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143,
145 (1970) (rule allowing correction of clerical error does not provide for a judgment
to be altered to state other than what the
court intended to pronounce); State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 1989) (unambiguous criminal order cannot be later modified to match "what the judge may have
intended"). Defendant supports this contention by repeating the argument that the
same court which initially sentenced him to
probation could not revoke probation which
had not yet really been imposed. While
this simple logic has obvious appeal, we
nonetheless proceed with our review of the
Rule 60(a) order as if its entry were a valid
exercise of correcting a clerical error.12

As the Green Court noted, the Legislature proclaimed a "strong mandate" that
probation shall terminate upon the expiration of the eighteen-month term, unless the
state successfully seeks revocation or extension of probation within the appropriate
period. Green, 757 P.2d at 464. Just as
the Supreme Court in Green found automatic tolling of probation to be inconsistent
with that strong mandate, id., we find imposition of a stay of probation to be equally
inconsistent. Cf. Denney, 776 P.2d at 9293 (even though court may have intended
to impose two eighteen-month probation
periods, probation terminated by operation
of law eighteen months after imposition,
absent extension, revocation or unambiguously-stated consecutive terms of probation for different offenses). The result eschewed in Green, that defendant could be
potentially exposed to an indefinite probationary term, would similarly be present
where imposition of probation was indeterminately stayed.14 Such a construction
"would obviate the certainty and regularity
created by the [probation] statute."
Green, 757 P.2d at 464.

The revised sentence, entered on July 26,
1990, states that
Defendant is granted a stay of the sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this Court under the supervision

Finally, we note that defendant's probation, whether actually imposed or not, was
revoked and defendant actually served time
in prison for the original offense on the
basis that he had violated probation. After

12. The very nature of a Rule 60(a) order suggests validity—the judge who initially pronounced judgment is merely restating his or her
intent in order that it might be accurately reflected in the written record. Deferential review of the propriety of Rule 60(a) orders would
be inappropriate, however, if the record unambiguously expressed a judgment contrary to that
stated in the Rule 60(a) order of clerical revision. See Denney, 776 P.2d at 93.

tion, which, in the court's later view, had not yet
been imposed, or at least executed.

13. At least in terms of defendant's first postsentence return from New Mexico, even this 18
month period had already expired at the time
the court "clarified" defendant's sentence. Defendant had returned to Utah at least by November 10, 1988, at which time he was incarcerated
at the Utah State Prison for violation of probaUtahRep 815-819 P 2d—4

14. The potential for abuse is obvious. A court
could impose a probationary term of 18 months,
with execution stayed for 10 years unless defendant should earlier violate conditions of the
stay, which could simply track the provisions of
probation. Such a defendant would be subject
to an W/i year de facto probation, a result
clearly at odds with the pronouncements of our
Legislature and Supreme Court.
Such potential for abuse is not present where
a sentence which includes probation is stayed
pending appeal, and nothing stated in this opinion about probation and stays has applicability
to that more straightforward situation.
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a term of incarceration, defendant was
granted parole and released from prison
under the supervision of parole agents.
Once a person is subjected to the strong
grasp of the law through parole it is inconsistent with the order of the system to
reach out with yet another arm of the law
and impose supervision under a probation
scheme, which is essentially a pre-incarceration measure, not a post-release adjunct to
parole supervision. Once the state has the
parole "hook" in a defendant's life, further
supervisory entanglement is somewhat superfluous.15
CONCLUSION
We hold that defendant's probation terminated eighteen months following imposition, which occurred at the time of initial
sentencing. The state's efforts to comply
with statutory provisions for revoking or
extending defendant's probation were not
timely. Accordingly, the Rule 60(a) order
is vacated and defendant's probation and
parole are extinguished.16
GREENWOOD, J., concurs.
BENCH, Presiding Judge (dissenting):
I would dismiss this appeal.
In State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "under the settled rule of Hardy v.
Morris, Utah, 636 P.2d 473 (1981) [,] . . .
one who escapes places himself beyond the
reach of the judicial system and any ruling
cannot be enforced against him; therefore,
he should not be allowed to pursue an
appeal while out of custody." It is undis15. Under parole supervision, and subject to certain conditions, an offender may be immediately reincarcerated for a violation of parole terms,
which may or may not be an independent violation of state law. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11
(1990). Probation supervision provides for
comparatively less swift detention for violation
of the probation agreement, requiring a showing of cause and a judicial hearing. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (1990).
16. The probation purportedly imposed years after entry of the initial sentence is vacated because defendant's actual period of probation
had expired 18 months after initial sentence.
Parole is terminated because it grew out of a

puted that Moya is presently a fugitive
from the criminal justice system. Because
Moya has placed himself beyond the reach
of the judicial system, his appeal should be
dismissed.
My colleagues erroneously proceed to decide Moya's appeal. This error is compounded by their holding that Moya's probation expired by its own terms eighteen
months after the initial sentencing in September, 1984. The obvious flaw in the
majority's analysis is that Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp.1984) did
not unconditionally and automatically terminate any and all probationary periods at
eighteen months. Section 77-18-l(10)(a)
clearly stated that its effect was limited to
those cases where the probationer did not
violate probation. In the present case,
Moya violated his probation, an incident
report was filed by AP & P, and a bench
warrant was issued; therefore, the eighteen-month limitation was tolled. See
Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990).
As a practical matter, I fear the majority's holding in this case will encourage
other probationers to abscond until the
statutory time after sentencing has
elapsed. The probationers may thereby be
free from the threat of incarceration and
all conditions attached to their probation.
This bizarre possibility will, in turn, lead
trial courts not to even consider probation
as an alternative at sentencing.

term of imprisonment which was imposed for
probation violations not acted upon prior to the
expiration of probation. Since defendant had
no probation to violate at that time, he had no
probation to revoke and should not have gone
to prison on that basis. Had he not gone to
prison, he would have not been paroled.
The author senses being guilty in this case of
"making the easy ones look hard," and fears
that our labors at scholarly discussion, against a
bizarre factual background, may promote more
bewilderment than understanding. In simplest
terms, our holding is this: There is no such
thing as going to prison for violating conditions
of probation which did not come into existence
until release from prison on parole.

L.
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failed to establish fraud in this case, and in
the absence of fraud the merger doctrine
applies. Therefore we affirm the judgment
of no cause of action against the Petersons,
and we uphold the injunction ordered by
the trial court.
[3] Finally, the Knights have appealed
from the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty action against Guardian Title.
The trial court found no fiduciary relationship existed between the Knights and
Guardian, and our review of the record
indicates ample evidentiary support for
that finding. We therefore also affirm the
dismissal of the action against Guardian
Title Company.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

Board of State Lands and Forestry sought
mandamus following Board's decision to
lease the property to another firm, alleging
that the lease procedures were contrary to
state law. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that the firm lacked standing.
Petition denied.
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion in
which Durham, J., concurred.

1. Parties <3=>76(3)
Supreme Court could raise issue of a
party's standing to bring a petition to challenge legality of lease of property by state
land board sua sponte, regardless of parties' failure to raise or address the question.
2. Mandamus <s=»22
Petitioner for extraordinary relief
must have standing, just as any other litigant must.

TERRACOR, a Utah
corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
The UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS &
FORESTRY, George Buzianis, Chairman of the Utah Board of State Lands
& Forestry, the Utah Division of State
Lands & Forestry, Ralph Miles, Director of the Division of State Lands &
Forestry, Utah Department of Natural
Resources, Temple A. Reynolds, Executive Director of the Utah Department of
Natural Resources, Bloomington Knolls
Association, a Utah nonprofit association, Joseph E. Jones, Roy Hardy, principals of Bloomington Knolls Association, Defendants.

3. Action @=>13
Supreme Court will not lightly dispense with requirement that litigant have a
personal stake in outcome of a specific
dispute. Const. Art. 5, § 1.

March 7, 1986.

4. Action <§=>13
General standards for determining
whether a litigant has standing are: that
plaintiff be able to show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury,
that, if plaintiff does not have standing
under this criterion, he may have standing
if no one else has greater interest in outcome and issues are unlikely to be raised at
all unless that particular plaintiff had
standing to raise issue and, even if standing is not found under the first two criteria, plaintiff may nonetheless have standing if issues are unique and of such great
public importance that they ought to be
decided in furtherance of public interest.
Const. Art. 5, § 1.

Firm which had sought to exchange
property it held for school lands held by

5. Mandamus <§=>23(1)
Firm which had sought to exchange
property with Board of State Lands and

No. 20270.
Supreme Court of Utah.
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Forestry for purpose of developing it
lacked standing to seek mandamus to challenge Board's subsequent decision to lease
the property due to existence of potential
plaintiffs with a more direct interest where
firm specifically conceded that challenge
was not based on failure to accept the
proposal, but on procedures used. Const.
Art. 5; U.C.A.1953, 65-1-68; Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 65B(b)(3); Rules App.Proc,
Rule 19.
Peter W. Billings, Jr., Denise A. Dragoo,
Rosemary J. Beless, Michelle Mitchell, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Anne M.
Stirba, Asst. Atty. Gen., Clark Arnold, Salt
Lake City, for defendants.
STEWART, Justice:
Pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(3) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure,1 the plaintiff, Terracor, petitions this Court for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus, directing the Board of State Lands
and Forestry and the Division of State
Lands and Forestry to rescind a special use
lease ("SULA 593") issued by the Board to
Bloomington Knolls Association. Terracor
1. Terracor's petition was filed with this Court
October 29, 1984. A petition for extraordinary
writ to a judge or agency filed with this Court
after January 1, 1985, would be governed by
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2. Section 65-1-68 states:
Any portion of the public lands of this state
not occupied by bona fide settlers having preference right of purchase, may be subdivided
into lots, and sold as provided in this chapter,
the board first being satisfied that by a subdivision of any tract into lots a sale of the same
can be made for a greater amount than if sold
in legal subdivisions. The board may survey
such tracts and direct their subdivision. A
plat of the survey shall be filed in the office of
the county recorder of the county wherein the
land is situated, and a copy in the office of the
board. Tracts so subdivided shall not be subject to lease, but each lot shall be sold at
public auction at such times as the board may
direct. The manner of appraisement and sale
of such subdivided lands shall be in all respects the same as in the case of other lands
sold.

alleges that (1) the Board violated U.C.A.,
1953, § 65-1-68,2 which permits the Board
to sell subdivided school trust lands by
public auction but does not allow the Board
to dispose of such lands by negotiated leases; and (2) the Board breached its fiduciary
responsibility to obtain the highest possible
return from school trust lands by issuing
SULA 593 without competitive bidding.
Terracor claims that extraordinary relief is
necessary because it has no plain and adequate remedy at law since section 65-1-9,3
which provides for appeals from some
kinds of Board decisions, does not expressly state that appeals should be to the district court and that under decisions of this
Court it is not clear whether this Court or
the district court is the proper forum for an
appeal in the first instance. Terracor also
claims extraordinary relief is appropriate
because the language of section 65-1-68 is
clear and mandatory, and under Archer v.
Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321,
392 P.2d 622, 623 (1964), and Hamblin v.
State Board of Land Commissioners, 55
Utah 402, 187 P. 178 (1919), as well as Rule
65B, mandamus is an appropriate remedy
where a public agency or official has violated a clear duty mandated by statute. The
defendants counter that extraordinary re3. Section 65-1-9 states:
(1) Where contests arise as to the preference rights of claimants for lands under the
control of the board, it shall have full power
to hold a hearing thereon and to direct the
taking of evidence concerning the questions
involved, which hearing shall be reported in
full. The board shall make findings of fact
and conclusions of law, enter its order with
respect thereto, and notify the parties to such
hearing of its findings, conclusions and order.
(2) No claimant for lands under control of
the board can appeal for judicial review of a
decision of the board involving any sale,
lease, or disposition of state lands, or any
action relating thereto, unless such claimant
files a written protest with respect thereto
with the board within ninety days after the
final decision of the board relating to such
matter; or, with respect to decisions rendered
prior to the effective date of this act, within
ninety days after such effective date. This
provision shall not relate to disputes between
the board and any party as to the ownership
or title to any lands.
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lief is improper because Terracor only
seeks clarification of an unclear statute
and that Terracor had a plain and adequate
legal remedy by means of an appeal under
section 65-1-9. Since we deny Terracor's
petition for an extraordinary writ because
it lacks standing, we do not decide these
issues.
In late 1983 or early 1984, Terracor approached the State Land Board and sought
to acquire the 10.9-acre parcel of land at
issue by exchanging an equivalent amount
of property that Terracor owned. Some
time after that, Bloomington Knolls applied
to the Land Board to lease the same 10.9
acres, with the intention of subdividing the
parcel for development as homesites. The
Board notified Terracor of the competing
proposal and explained that to make the
land exchange acceptable Terracor would
have to offer more land in exchange, or
land of a greater value, since the land
Terracor had offered would not be developable for several years. The Board also
notified Terracor that approval of the lease
to Bloomington Knolls would, in effect,
constitute a rejection of Terracor's proposal. Terracor did nothing more toward negotiating an exchange. In May, 1984, the
Board leased the 10.9 acres of school trust
land to Bloomington Knolls.
Terracor protested the Land Board's
leasing procedure on the ground that it
was contrary to state law and that it would
result in unfair competition. On September 18, 1984, the Board ruled that Terracor
had waived its right to protest by doing
nothing to indicate a continuing interest in
the land after being informed of Bloomington Knolls' proposal. The Board also ruled
that its procedures were in compliance with
state law and that it had not violated its
fiduciary responsibilities with respect to
the administration of state school trust
lands by leasing the disputed parcel pursuant to a negotiated lease rather than by
auction.
Terracor then filed this petition for extraordinary relief directly in this Court.
Terracor does not assert in this action that
the Board erred in refusing Terracor's pro-

posed exchange. Indeed, in its "Petition
for Relief Under Rule 65B(b)(3)" filed in
this Court, Terracor admits that it does not
now challenge the granting of the lease to
Bloomington Knolls rather than to it.
Thus, the action in this Court is not based
on Terracor's losing out to Bloomington
Knolls for the parcel in question. Rather,
Terracor asserts only that the Board violated state law by leasing rather than selling
the parcel in question and violated its fiduciary duty to maximize the return on all
school trust lands by negotiating a lease of
a portion of those lands rather than requiring competitive bidding. It is noteworthy
that Terracor's aborted efforts to acquire
the land were based on the same type of
negotiated procedure that it now alleges is
illegal.
[1,2] The parties have not raised or
addressed the question of Terracor's standing to bring this petition to challenge the
legality of the Land Board's lease. However, this Court may address that issue sua
sponte. Utah Restaurant Association v.
Dams County Board of Health, Utah, 709
P.2d 1159 (1985); Heath Tecna Corp. v.
Sound Systems International, Inc., Utah,
588 P.2d 169, 170 (1978). A petitioner for
extraordinary relief must have standing,
just as any other litigant must have. See,
e.g., Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah 329, 336,
203 P. 637, 640-41 (1921); Crockett v.
Board of Education, 58 Utah 303, 309, 199
P. 158, 160 (1921).
[3] The doctrine of standing is intended
to assure the procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by requiring that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest
in the subject matter of the dispute and
sufficient adverseness that the legal and
factual issues which must be resolved will
be thoroughly explored. Unlike federal
law where standing doctrine is related to
the "case or controversy" language of Article III of the United States Constitution,
our standing law arises from the general
precepts of the doctrine of separation of
powers found in Article V of the Utah
Constitution. Under Utah law, the doctrine of standing operates as gatekeeper to
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in only those
the courthouse, allowing m
cases that are fit for judicial resolution.
Important jurisprudential considerations
dictate that courts confine themselves to
resolution of those disputes most effectively resolved through the judicial process,
i.e., crystalized disputes concerning specific
factual situations. Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947
(1968); Jenkins v. Swan, Utah, 675 P.2d
1145, 1149 (1983). Thus, the doctrine of
standing limits judicial power so that there
will not "be a significant inroad on the
representative form of government,
castpng] the courts in the role of supervising the coordinate branches of government
. . . [and converting] the judiciary into an
open forum for the resolution of political
and ideological disputes about the performance of government." Baird v. State,
Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (1978). See also
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
188-92, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 2952-54, 41 L.Ed.2d
678 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). For
this reason, this Court will not lightly dispense with the requirement that a litigant
have a personal stake in the outcome of a
specific dispute. Jenkins v. Swan, supra,
675 P.2d at 1150; see also Stromquist v.
Cokayne, Utah, 646 P.2d 746, 747 (1982);
Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289,
290 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585
P.2d 442, 443 (1978); Sears v. Ogden City,
Utah, 572 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1977). Nevertheless, it is difficult to make useful, all-inclusive generalizations that determine
whether standing exists in any given case,
since the issue often depends on the facts
of each case. Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Salt Lake County, Utah, 702 P.2d 451, 453
(1985); Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 151, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d
184 (1970).
[4] This Court has referred to three
general standards for determining whether
a litigant has standing.4 Jenkins v. Swan,
supra, 675 P.2d at 1150; see also Kenne4. In addition, taxpayers may have standing to
challenge an illegal expenditure. E.g., Lyon v.
Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 (1951);

cott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County,
supra, 702 P.2d at 454. The premise upon
which these standards have been constructed is that issues should generally be litigated by those parties with the most direct
interest in resolution of those issues, although in some cases a party who does not
have the most immediate or direct interest
may have standing.
The first general criterion is that the
"[p]laintiff must be able to show that he
has suffered some distinct and palpable
injury that gives him a personal stake in
the outcome of the legal dispute." Jenkins
v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 1148. See also
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, supra, 702 P.2d at 454; Stromquist v. Cokayne, supra, 646 P.2d at 747;
Sears v. Ogden City, supra, 572 P.2d at
1362; Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake
City Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d 866 (1975);
Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17
Utah 2d 337, 342 n.7, 411 P.2d 831, 834 n.7
(1966); State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 504,
94 P.2d 414, 420 (1939) (must be personally
affected by operation of statute to attack
its validity).
Second, if a plaintiff does not have standing under the first criterion, he may have
standing if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless
that particular plaintiff has standing to
raise the issue. Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. Salt Lake County, supra, 702 P.2d at
454; Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at
1150. See also Startup v. Harmon, 59
Utah 329, 336, 203 P. 637, 640-41 (1921);
Crockett v. Board of Education, 58 Utah
303, 309, 199 P. 158, 160 (1921).
Third, even though standing is not found
to exist under the first two criteria, a plaintiff may nonetheless have standing if the
issues are unique and of such great public
importance that they ought to be decided in
furtherance of the public interest. Jenkins
v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 1150; Jenkins
Tooele Building Association v. Tooele High
School District, 43 Utah 362, 134 P. 894 (1913).
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v. Finlinson, supra, 607 P.2d at 290; Jenkins v. State, supra, 585 P.2d at 443.
[5] Terracor meets none of these requirements. It has not alleged any "particularized injury to [itself] by virtue of
the claimed wrong." Jenkins v. Swan,
supra, 675 P.2d at 1151 (emphasis in original). Terracor's proposed exchange of land
for the tract which was subsequently
leased to Bloomington Knolls by SULA 593
does not provide a valid basis for standing
since Terracor has specifically conceded in
its pleadings that its challenge is not based
on the Board's failure to accept that proposal. Indeed, Terracor does not assert
that its proposal was of greater value or
advantage to the State than Bloomington
Knolls' proposal. In fact, Terracor's own
proposal for a negotiated exchange was
wholly inconsistent with the position it now
asserts that such lands can only be disposed of by public auction.
Terracor fares no better under the second part of the Jenkins analysis. There
are others who could raise the same challenges raised by Terracor, and who would
have a greater, more direct interest in doing so. For example, one who attempts to
purchase the same school lands as another
and loses out to the other would have
standing if the basis of the action was the
failure of the Board to lease to that particular person rather than the competition to
one's business or a result of a lease to
another party. Furthermore, beneficiaries
of the school trust land would no doubt
have standing to assert a violation of the
Board's fiduciary responsibility to maximize the return from school trust lands.
Thus, the State Treasurer, who receives
20% of all monies collected by the Division
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 65-1-13, and
possibly the Attorney General, would have
standing to assert a violation by the Board
of its legal and fiduciary responsibilities.
Since there are "other potential plaintiffs
with a more direct interest" in the issues m
this case, we decline to reach the third test,
whether the public importance of the issues
raised is so great that they ought to be

litigated in any event. Jenkins v. Swan,
supra, 675 P.2d at 1151.
Since Terracor does not have standing,
we do not address the question whether
Terracor has an adequate remedy at law by
way of an appeal under section 65-1-9.
Petition denied. No costs.
HALL, C.J., and SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge, concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.
SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge, sat.
HOWE, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent from what I perceive to be a
very narrow application of the rules of
"standing" to the plaintiff. The Land
Board had before it two competing proposals. Terracor's proposal was to exchange
land. Bloomington Knolls' proposal was to
lease the state land and subdivide it for
home sites. The Board rejected Terracor's
proposal and accepted the proposal of
Bloomington Knolls'. Terracor protested
to the Board, and now protests to this
Court, that the Board has no statutory
authority to lease state lands and that in so
doing unfair competition resulted.
The majority concedes that "one who attempts to purchase the same school lands
as another and loses out to the other person, would have standing." Yet the majority holds that Terracor has no standing
even though it was attempting to acquire
the same lands as its competitor Bloomington Knolls but proposed to do so by exchange rather than by leasing. Why that
difference should destroy Terracor's standing completely eludes me. The majority
seems to find comfort in the fact that Terracor declined the Board's invitation to
make its proposal more attractive. Terracor, thereafter, the majority argues, had no
interest and lacked standing to question
what the Board did with the land. I cannot
subscribe to this reasoning. In the first
place, Terracor's rejection came simultaneous with Bloomington Knolls' acceptance. The rejection and the acceptance
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were not separated by a period of time.
Secondly, the interest of a competitor does
not necessarily dissipate when its proposal
is rejected. It remains interested in what
the Board does thereafter with the land,
especially when, as alleged here, the Board
disposes of it in an alleged unlawful transaction which should be set aside and the
land restored to the Board.
The majority endeavors to find support
for its holding that Terracor lacks standing
because "Terracor does not assert in this
action that the Board erred in refusing
Terracor's proposed exchange." That argument leads nowhere. Of course, the
Board has discretion in choosing proposals
before it. Neither Terracor nor any other
competitor could validly argue that the
Board was obliged to accept its proposal.
However, what Terracor is contending for
is that the Board accepted a proposal which
it could not lawfully do. When unlawful
proposals are removed from consideration
by the Board, the Board is left to reconsider the remaining proposals. Furthermore,
as long as the land remains in the hands of
the Board, a competitor is afforded the
continuing opportunity to "sweeten" his
proposal.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of HOWE, J.
O
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beneficiaries of estate, sought to be joined
in probate court proceedings as interested
party. The Seventh District Court, Sanpete County, Don V. Tibbs, J., denied the
motion to be joined. Judgment creditor
appealed. The Supreme Court held that
judgment creditor of estate beneficiary,
which was not creditor of estate, and had
no property right in or claim against estate,
was not entitled to access to probate proceedings.
Affirmed.
1. A c t i o n <£=>3

Where statute creates cause of action
and designates those who may sue under it,
none except those designated may sue.
2. Wills <3=>872
Judgment creditor of beneficiary of estate, which was not creditor of estate and
had no property right in or claim against
estate, was not entitled to access to probate
proceedings to reach assets of estate to
satisfy judgment. U.C.A.1953, 75-1-201(4,
20), 75-1-302, 75-3-1001(1).
Stephen L. Johnston, Salt Lake City, for
appellant.
Dale O. Andersen, W. Andrew McCullough, Orem, Thomas R. Patton, Provo, for
respondent.
Richard R. Peterson, Jr., pro se.

PER CURIAM:
Freed Leasing, Inc. (Freed) appeals from
an order of the Sanpete County Probate
Court denying its motion to be joined as an
interested
party. We affirm.
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF
Richard R. PETERSON, aka
Freed was a judgment creditor of RichRichard Ross Peterson.
ard R. Peterson, Jr. (Peterson) against
whom it had vainly tried to execute on a
No. 19784.
judgment. Peterson filed a homestead exSupreme Court of Utah.
emption when Freed attempted to execute
on his residence in Utah County. Peterson
March 11, 1986.
was also the informally appointed personal
representative of the estate of Richard R.
Judgment creditor which, at best, had Peterson, Sr. (decedent) against whose esinterest in contingent interest of one of tate Freed next attempted to impose its lien

